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Representing the Community: A Look at the
Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital
Sentencing
STANTON D. KRAuss*
Should a person be executed? Should a work be condemned as obscene?
At first blush, the idea of comparing the ways in which these decisions
are supposed to be made may seem very odd. After all, what in the world
do capital sentencing and the regulation of obscene speech have in com-
mon?
At one level of abstraction, however, capital sentencing law and ob-
scenity law are surprisingly similar. In each context, the Constitution
requires that annihilation decisions be a product of what is essentially a
two-pronged inquiry, On the one hand, a threshold determination must
be made as to whether the subject before the court falls within a legally-
defined category rendering it eligible, as a matter of constitutional law,
to be destroyed. On the other hand, the trier must make what I shall refer
to as a "selection" decision on behalf of the community. This means that
the trier must make an individualized, moral judgment as to whether the
subject, if eligible for destruction, deserves that fate.1
Despite the similarity of the selection decisions that must be made in
these two settings, the law demands that triers make them in very different
ways. Capital sentencers are expected to determine whether an eligible
defendant deserves to die according to their personal moral standards.
Thus, when this decision is assigned to a judge, the judge speaks for the
community only in the sense that he or she speaks in its name. Yet when
this decision is assigned to a jury, the jury is supposed to "express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death," 2
as the law trusts that the decisions of a randomly selected group of people
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University; B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D.
1978, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Francis A. Allen, Susan F. Appleton, Merton
C. Bernstein, Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Richard A. Epstein, Daniel A. Farber, Jules B. Gerard,
Bernard Grofman, Yale Kamlsar, Cristie Tober Krauss, Richard B. Kuhns, Stephen H.
Legomsky, Ronald M. Levin, William B. Lockhart, Daniel R. Mandelker, Charles R. McManis,
Frank W. Miller, Stanley L. Paulson, Frederick Schauer, Carl E. Schneider, and E. Thomas
Sullivan for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Professor Stephen Gillers dubbed this aspect of the capital sentencing process the
"selection" stage in his seminal article, Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. Rv. 1,
20, 26-31 (1980), and the name has stuck. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78
(1983). It has not, however, previously been applied to the analogous phase of an obscenity
case.
2. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (citation omitted).
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voting as "free agents" can be expected to mirror the community's
preferences. In obscenity cases, by way of contrast, judges and juries are
instructed to make these decisions by identifying and applying community
standards. That is, they are told to function as the community's "dele-
gates." 3
Given the special constitutional value of life and freedom of expression,
and the extensive constitutional regulation of the procedures by which
selection decisions are made in each context, it seems natural to ask why
these differences exist, and whether they ought to. This inquiry raises
some important questions of constitutional law, psychology, epistemology,
and political theory: In what sense do triers "represent" the community
in the selection phase of these proceedings? What do we mean when we
say that they must express "the community's" sentiments in these contexts?
How accurately can juries or judges identify community sentiments in
these cases? How accurately can they express those feelings by making
these selection decisions as free agents? How much freedom should a
legislature have in these settings to define a community's moral standards,
select the means for their ascertainment, or authorize triers to make
selection decisions without regard to public opinion? These are some of
the issues that I shall explore in this article.
But first, in Part I, I will fill in the details of the picture of capital
sentencing and obscenity law outlined above. In Parts II and III, I will
examine the procedures according to which juries are to resolve the
selection issues in these settings. Part II will evaluate the representational
theories according to which juries are supposed to voice community
sentiments in obscenity cases and capital sentencing proceedings. Part III
will consider whether there is any reason to use different means of
expressing the community's moral sensibilities in these contexts. Finally,
in Part IV, I will explore the issues raised by a comparison of the different
ways in which judges are directed to speak for the community in these
cases.
I.
Over the last thirty years, capital sentencing law and obscenity law have,
in great measure, been constitutionalized. In each area, the Supreme Court
3. The term "delegate" has been used in political science literature to describe this theory
of representation. See, e.g., R. DAVImsON, Tnm ROLE OF THE CONGREssMAN 113-21 (1969); H,
PrrxIN, TBm CONCEPT OF REPRiEsENTATON 133-34, 146-47 (1967). It is worth noting that the
dichotomy between the "delegation" and "free agency" models of representation is not the
same as the Burkean dichotomy between delegates and trustees, see BUrKm's SPEzcHns &
LETERs ON AmucAN AFFAIRs 72-75 (1911); R. DAVMSON, supra, at 113-21; H. PrrIIN, supra,
at 168-89, because the "free agent" is not bound to make decisions with an eye to the welfare
of the represented. Thus, the "free agency" model resembles what Professor Hanna Pitkin
calls the "authorization view" and ascribes to Hobbes, among others. See id. at 14-59, 113.
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has promulgated rules that call upon triers to make selection decisions on
the basis of the subject's moral standing, while at the same time restricting
(at least in theory) the domain within which triers are free in these cases
to translate their morality into law. To this extent, the Court has structured
capital sentencing law and obscenity law in a similar manner. However,
the Court has also sanctioned the use of rather different procedures for
carrying out the selection phase of this process in these two settings.
A.
The eighth amendment forbids the imposition of "cruel and unusual
punishments." '4 While it has ruled that this principle does not categorically
outlaw capital punishment,5 the Court has decided that it does limit the
conditions under which the death penalty may be imposed. For example,
the Court has invoked the eighth amendment in holding execution an
impermissible sanction for the crimes of raping an adult woman6 and
kidnapping. 7
At present, murder is the only crime for which the Court has held
execution to be an acceptable punishment.8 However, not everyone con-
victed of murder may be sentenced to die.9 A capital murder must be an
"aggravated" murder, and its perpetrator must belong to a legislatively
defined class of convicted murderers upon whom there is what the Court
considers a constitutionally legitimate penological reason to impose the
ultimate penalty-e.g., people who had previously been convicted of
another violent felony or who committed the instant murder in the course
of committing another felony. 10 Moreover, the death penalty may not be
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This prohibition applies equally to the states. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
7. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam).
8. The legitimacy of executing some classes of people convicted of murder was settled (at
least for the time being) in Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. Part of the Court's reasoning in Coker, 433
U.S. 584, suggests that capital punishment may be inflicted only upon defendants found guilty
of murder, see id. at 598, but the constitutionality of executing people convicted of treason
(or even attempted murder) remains undecided. See generally Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan:
The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 99
(1983).
9. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-80 (1983).
10. Id. The "aggravating" circumstance may be found at the guilt or penalty phase of a
murder trial. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988). The universe of valid "aggravating"
factors is so expansive that it is doubtful whether this rule significantly "narrow[s] the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty," Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. But see Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Finally, the "aggravating"
circumstances cited in the text are found in many states' statutes. See Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 328-38.
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made mandatory for all eligible class members." The State must allow
capital sentencers to give whatever mitigating weight they deem appropriate
to "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death,"' 2 and no one may be condemned to die unless
the trier concludes that, given who this defendant is and what he did, he
deserves to die.' 3
Triers are basically given no guidance as to how to make this selection
decision. Rather, they are told simply to decide whether the factors
favoring death outweigh those favoring life, and to cast their votes
accordingly.' 4 It follows that capital sentencing judges and jurors are left
11. See Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
12. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). See
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). However, the State may limit a capital sentencer's
right to consider arguments or evidence in aggravation. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 n.17.
13. I have previously noted that it is not clear how Texas' capital sentencing scheme can
be squared with this requirement. See Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-
Qualification Reexamined, 24 Am. Cimn. L. REv. 1, 62-67 (1986). The same doubts also apply
to Oregon's law. See State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 198-208, 752 P.2d 1136, 1188-93 (1988)
(Linde, J., dissenting); id. at 219-35, 752 P.2d at 1200-09 (Gillette, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320 (1988).
Three of the Justices opined that, if Texas' capital sentencing laws mean what they say, that
State's capital punishment scheme is unconstitutional. See id. at 2338-41 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor, speaking on behalf of herself and Justice Blackmun, found it
unnecessary to decide this question, but hinted that she is of the same view. See id. at 2332-
35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). After rejecting Franklin's claim that his jury
was unconstitutionally forced to ignore mitigating factors about his case, the other four Justices
gratuitously denied that Texas' capital sentencing juries obey their instructions and pronounced
its death penalty laws constitutional. See id. at 2331-32 (plurality opinion) (dictum).
The Court will be confronted with another challenge to the validity of Texas' capital
sentencing scheme in Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.
Ct. 2896 (1988), and perhaps it will settle this question when it decides that case.
14. See, e.g., CALIFoRNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CmRmUAL 8.84.2 (Supp. 1987); Florida
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, FLA. Cim. LAws & RULEs 730 (1987). Texas
and Oregon do not allow their capital sentencers such discretion, and so the constitutionality
of both states' capital sentencing laws is in doubt. See supra note 13. On the other hand,
jurors in several states are told they may vote for life even if the "aggravating" circumstances
outweigh "mitigating" circumstances in the case at bar. See, e.g., COUcNIL OF SUPERIOR COURT
JUDGES OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 108 (Carl Vinson Institute of
Government, University of Georgia 1984); MIssouRI APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CR NAL 313.46
(3d ed. 1987). In light of the fact that these states regard jurors who are simply unwilling to
impose a death sentence as excludable for bias, see infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text,
it is not clear just what message these instructions are meant to convey. Perhaps they simply
represent a confused way of saying that jurors may vote for life if they think that appropriate
on the facts of the case. For a provocative analysis of the implications of the fact that
instructions commonly apprise capital sentencing jurors of the nature of their responsibility in
the selection phase of their deliberations in technical legal terms, instead of plain English, see
Weisberg, supra note 10, at 388-95.
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to make selection decisions according to their personal moral standards.,.,
Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted the sixth16 and fourteenth17 amend-
ment command that sentencing juries be "impartial" 18 to mean that they
must be able to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death."1 9
B.
Although the first amendment commands that the Government "shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"' 2 thirty
years of Supreme Court decisions have established that obscene books and
15. The Supreme Court assumes that this is how judges, see infra notes 165-69 and
accompanying text, and jurors, see Krauss, supra note 13, at 17 & n.60, make their selection
decisions. It is also the most reasonable way to read the relevant state laws. See Gillers, supra
note I, at 64 n.301.
The California courts, which have most directly addressed this question, have held not
only that each juror must "weigh" mitigating and aggravating circumstances on his own moral
scales, see, e.g., People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227, 753 P.2d 669, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1988);
People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1987), cert. denied 108
S. Ct. 202 (1987); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987), but that it is error to instruct jurors to
determine a defendant's fate by looking to the dictates of the community's conscience, see
People v. Harrison, 59 Cal. 2d 622, 381 P.2d 665, 20 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1963). Indeed, in
California, as in some other states, jurors are told that they are the sole judges of the weight
to be given to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the case before them.
See CAuFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRaNI.L 8.84.2 (Supp. 1987); see also, e.g., NORTH
CAROLINA PATTERN INSTRUCIONS-CRIMINAL § 150.10 (May 1987).
16. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury ... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
17. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall ....
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
In light of the fact that the sixth amendment right to jury trial does not apply to capital
sentencing proceedings, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), I am puzzled as to why the
sixth amendment (as opposed to the fifth or eighth amendments) should have any bearing
whatsoever on the composition of capital sentencing juries. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 78-
88.
19. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 (citation omitted). See also, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi,
481 U.S. 648 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 & n.32 (1987).
This does not mean that the State is obligated to ensure that capital sentencing juries be
drawn from a pool representing a fair cross-section of the community's sentencing attitudes,
or that actual juries include adherents of any particular views. See Krauss, Death-Qualification
After Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Mississippi, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 507, 538 n.136
(1987). Rather, the Court presumes that a capital sentencing jury is "impartial" (in this sense)
as long as it was picked from a fair cross-section of the community and death-qualification
(which is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 35-67) was not misused to improperly
skew it in favor of death. See, e.g., Gray, 481 U.S. at 658; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 310;
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177-84 (1986).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition applies equally to the state and federal
governments. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
1989]
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pictures do not come within these guarantees. 21 For a long time, a majority
of the Justices could not agree about the scope of this constitutional lacuna.?
In Miller v. California, 23 however, five Members of the Court endorsed a
single definition of obscenity. Under this view, which remains the law today,
a work is obscene-and therefore unprotected-if several criteria are met,
viz., "taken as a whole," it must "appeal to the prurient interest" and
"lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," and it must
"depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, ['hard core'] sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state [or federal] law." 2
Much of this formulation is ambiguous. What, for example, is "prurient
appeal"? 2 Does a work's "patent offensiveness" turn upon the reagent's
personal reaction to seeing it, or his willingness to tolerate its availability
to those who would like to see it?26 And does the requirement that "prurient
21. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115
(1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957). The first twenty years of this story is chronicled in Professor Frederick
Schauer's excellent book, F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OascENrfY (1976).
Radio and television broadcasting may be subject to greater regulation, FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), as may child pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982), and the dissemination of pornography to children, Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968). However, these matters are beyond the scope of this article.
22. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22.
23. 413 U.S. 15.
24. Id. at 24. Despite the Court's longstanding insistence that "obscenity" must be sexually-
related speech, see, e.g., id. at 18 n.2, in some of the very same opinions, the Court has also
suggested, without comment or explanation, that the concept also embraces speech relating to
excretory functions or excretia. See, e.g., id. at 25; Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. In this article,
I will use the term only in the former, narrower, sense.
25. From the beginning, it has been clear that "prurient appeal" involves the stimulation
of "lustful thoughts." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 20 (1971). In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985), the Court explained that
this meant only those "sexual responses over and beyond those that would be characterized
as normal." Id. at 498. Unfortunately, however, the Court did not explain its explanation. If
material that basically titillates the sexual appetites of "normal" people does not "appeal to
the prurient interest," is the concept (and the State's power to regulate pornography) restricted
to depictions of sexually deviant behavior (whatever that means)? If not (and I suspect that
"prurient appeal" is not so limited), what does it mean?
26. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 133. The lower courts appear to be divided on this
issue. Compare State v. Anderson, 85 N.C. App. 104, 111-12, 354 S.E.2d 264, 268 (taking
former view), rev'd on other grounds, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459, cert. denied 109 S. Ct.
513 (1988) with Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind. App. 1985) (taking latter view),
petition for transfer denied, 484 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. 1985).
The "reaction" interpretation of Miller is consistent with the Court's numerous statements
to the effect that "the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the standard of 'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be certain that, so far as
material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person,
rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive one."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States,
436 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1978); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974).
However, it is hard to reconcile this reading of Miller with Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
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appeal" and "patent offensiveness" be judged from the perspective of "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" 27 mean that
triers are supposed to determine whether "the community" shares a common
standard of decency, or does it simply mean that they must ascertain
whether "the community" would agree that the material before the court
has these two qualities? 28 In either case, does "the community" refer to a
majority or a supermajority of the populace?29
291 (1977). Smith was a federal prosecution for mailing obscene material. This material was
sent by the defendant from one city in Iowa to adults elsewhere within the state. At the time,
Iowa did not regulate the dissemination of pornography to adults. Id. at 295. Although the
Court held that this did not conclusively prove that the "community" found nothing obscene
(a holding that was doubtless justified, inasmuch as the legally relevant community in Smith
was not statewide, but coextensive with the Southern District of Iowa), it also emphasized that
it thought the state legislature's laissez faire attitude towards erotica to be "relevant evidence
of the mores of the [statewide] community," and that it was entirely proper for the jury to
have been told about it. Id. at 307-08. As it is hard to believe that any reasonable person
could infer that Iowa had chosen to deregulate pornography because Iowans did not find
anything offensive to behold, this aspect of Smith seems to support the "toleration" interpre-
tation of Miller. (So, too, does Smith's characterization of itself as having decided "that
contemporary community standards must be applied by juries in accordance with their own
understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community." Id. at 305 (emphasis
added).). See also infra note 201.
If the "reaction" interpretation of Miller is correct, yet another question arises: Why
shouldn't a community be allowed to ban "worthless" erotica in deference to the sensibilities
of a minority of its members, or to protect the majority against the feared effects of "worthless"
erotica that it may even find attractive? Needless to say, the Court has not answered this
question.
27. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See Pope, 107 S. Ct. 1918; Smith, 431 U.S. 291.
28. Compare State v. Kam, 726 P.2d 263 (Haw. 1986) (adopting former view) with State
v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983) (adopting latter view).
29. At least two commentators have suggested that Miller requires that these standards
reflect the view of more than a simple majority of the community. Beckett & Bell, Community
Standards: Admitting a Public Opinion Poll Into Evidence in an Obscenity Case, CAsE &
COMMENT, Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 20, 22-24.
Whatever other questions may exist with respect to the meaning of the requirement that
obscenity selection decisions be made with an eye to "contemporary community standards,"
it should be noted that no Justice, judge, or commentator has evinced the slightest doubt
about whether the Court really means triers to make these decisions as their communities'
"delegates." There are a number of justifications for this consensus. First, the Justices have
repeatedly said that they expect obscenity triers to make selection decisions in this manner.
For example, in Smith, 431 U.S. at 291, Justice Stevens dwelt upon the necessity, and the
difficulty, of judging what a community's standards really are. See id. at 312-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In the same vein, Chief Justice Burger, commenting in Pinkus, 436 U.S. at 293,
upon "[t]he difficulty of framing charges in this area," id. at 300, wrote that "[c]autionary
instructions to avoid subjective personal and private views in determining community standards
can do no more than tell the individual juror that in evaluating the hypothetical 'average
person' he is to determine the collective view of the community, as best as it can be done,"
id. at 300-01. And in Miller, he explained the Court's rejection of the notion that triers must
apply the standards of a national "community" in the following way:
[O]ur Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the
prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would consider certain materials "pru-
1989]
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However, it is clear that Miller is largely cut from the same cloth as
capital sentencing law. The eligibility for repression30 of a statutorily pro-
scribed work3' turns upon its lacking the kind of value the Court feels the
first amendment was designed to protect.3 2 Whether or not an eligible work
will be condemned is left to the trier's judgment of its "prurient appeal"
and its "patent offensiveness. ' 33 But triers must be instructed to make this
selection decision according to the community's moral sense, not their own.3 4
rient," it would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract formu-
lation.... To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
"community standard" would be an exercise in futility. 413 U.S. at 30 (emphasis in original).
In sum, while holding that the first amendment allows obscenity triers to make selection
decisions in light of statewide standards, he concluded that it does not require that national
standards be employed because those standards are "hypothetical and unascertainable." Id.
at 31.
Moreover, a number of the constitutional rules promulgated by the Court would make no
sense whatsoever unless "contemporary community standards" was taken to be an empirical,
sociological concept. One such rule is the constitutional right of obscenity defendants to
introduce expert testimony about what "community standards" are. See infra note 104. Another
is the rule that a work's "value" cannot be determined according to "contemporary community
standards," but must be assessed from the perspective of the reasonable person. See Pope,
481 U.S. 497 (discussed infra notes at 190-93 and accompanying text).
Finally, this interpretation of the "contemporary community standards" doctrine is faithful
to the rationale first given by Justice Harlan for defining obscenity in terms of "contemporary
community standards": "The community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at
issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171
(1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra note 201.
30. The "repression" that Miller authorizes is not total suppression. While the Constitution
allows the State to regulate the sale of obscene material to adults, United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351 (1971), its transportation for their personal use, Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, and its public display before consenting adults, Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), held that the Constitution recognizes the right of
adults to possess and peruse obscenity in their homes.
31. The practical importance of Miller's requirement that the type of conduct depicted in
an allegedly "patently offensive" way in a challenged work must be "specifically" identified
"by the applicable . . . law, as written or authoritatively construed," Miller, 413 U.S. at 24,
is doubtful after Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
32. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment,
9 GA. L. REv. 533, 552-57 (1975). The limitation of "obscenity" to depictions or descriptions
of "hard core" sexual conduct is also "aimed at protecting first amendment interests" by
limiting "the range of material" that may be made eligible for condemnation under obscenity
laws. See id. at 546.
It is worth noting that there is no eighth amendment analogue to the doctrine that
pornography is protected "speech" whenever it has the kind of value mentioned in Miller. A
person convicted of murder may be condemned to die even though there is a significant reason
to spare his life. In other words, the law seems more solicitous to protect erotic art than
human life. But see CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (1985). But it is not the purpose of
this article to consider whether anything can be said for this apparent inversion of priorities,
and I leave that task to others, or at least to another day.
33. The Supreme Court has construed the Constitution to require that selection decisions
in obscenity cases be left to the trier of fact. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01; Pinkus, 436 U.S. at 296-301; Smith, 431 U.S. at
300-05; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104-06; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 30-34; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489-
90; infra text accompanying notes 143-52. See also, e.g., State v. Watson, 88 N.C. App. 624,
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This fact has wide-ranging implications, and it is to their exploration that
I will now turn.
II.
Even though capital sentencing jurors are supposed to vote as "free
agents" and obscenity jurors as "delegates," juries are expected to express
the sense of "the community" with respect to the selection issues in both
contexts. But what does this mean? What role does the legislature play in
identifying "community" preferences in these settings? And how likely is
it that either representational scheme will achieve its goal?
These questions form the focus of this section of the article. -First, I will
explore the representational theory underlying the rules governing capital
sentencing juries. I will then examine its counterpart in obscenity law.
A.
Since the members of a capital sentencing jury are commonly drawn from
the county in which the alleged murder occurred, 5 one might expect it to
be the "community" whose "conscience" the jury is supposed to "express
• . . on the ultimate question of life or death." If the jury really did
"express the conscience of [that] community," however, it might refuse to
accept the state's legislative judgment that death is a legitimate punishment.3 6
This could happen even if "expressing a community's conscience" simply
means carrying out the will of the local majority.3 7 After all, there are some
364 S.E.2d 683 (1988).
In some jurisdictions, juries are instructed in haec verba to gauge a work's "prurient
appeal" and "patent offensiveness" by the "community's" "contemporary standards." See,
e.g., Mmssoum APPROVED INsmaucnoNs-CamNAL 327.02 (3d ed. 1987). In others, instructions
frame the latter issue in terms of whether the work in question "goes substantially beyond
the customary limits of candor in [the community]." See, e.g., CALiFoRNiA JURY INsTRUCTIONs:
CismNAL 16.182 (Supp. 1987). It is not clear that these instructions mean the same thing, but
both direct juries to evaluate material's "patent offensiveness" by a transpersonal, social,
standard.
35. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE § 21.2(e) (1984). (Although four
people are on death row as a result of sentences imposed by federal military courts, see
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 22 (Nov. 1,
1988) [hereinafter DEATH Row], virtually all of the capital prosecutions currently being brought
in this country are being brought under state law. See F. ZmuNG & G. HAwKINs, CAPrrAL
PuNISmmNT AND THE Aimmuc AGENDA 141 (1986). It remains to be seen what effect the
enactment of the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
(1988), will have on this situation.)
36. I speak of the State's judgment because, at present, the death penalty is essentially a
creature of state law. See supra note 35.
37. It could also mean implementing only the consensus positions of the "qualified"
portion of the populace. See infra note 44; cf. supra text accompanying note 29.
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counties in which most of the populace favors the view that lost out in the
state legislature.3
In order to ensure that local juries be willing to implement the statewide
"community's" legislatively expressed penal policy, states are allowed to
challenge prospective capital sentencing jurors for cause 9 on the ground
that they would never vote to condemn a defendant to die. 40 (I will refer
to these jurors as automatic voters against death, or "AVADs.") Moreover,
every state that uses capital sentencing juries does "death-qualify" them. 4'
Thus, these juries are expected to speak only for that segment of the local
population which shares the legislature's apparent belief that some capital
murderers deserve to die. Somewhat more boldly, they might even be said
to "express the conscience of the [statewide] community."
Whichever of these domains capital sentencing juries are supposed to
represent, they are expected to speak its mind in a very strong sense. States
uniformly demand that death verdicts be unanimous 42 and generally make
mercy the automatic consequence of a jury's inability to achieve unanimity
38. The most obvious example of such a county would be one in which the majority of
the people are Quakers.
39. Jurors who are biased in fact or in the eyes of the law are subject to challenge for
cause. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 35, § 21.3(c).
40. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 n.32 (1987); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 51 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 541-42 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
Death-qualification also allows the for-cause excusal of jurors who would vote to acquit a
defendant they believed to be guilty of a capital offense in order to protect him against what
they believed would be an undeserved death sentence. See Krauss, supra note 19, at 507-09.
In addition, prospective jurors who would automatically vote to execute everyone convicted
of capital murder may be challenged for cause in many states. See Krauss, supra note 13, at
3 n.13. The Court has indicated that this practice is constitutionally mandated. See Ross v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (dictum).
For an examination of the history of and the constitutional limitations on the practice of
death-qualification, see Krauss, supra note 13, and Krauss, supra note 19.
41. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 4. It is noted therein that there was a time when Iowa
and South Dakota did not regard AVADs as ipso facto unfit for service in capital cases. Id.
at 4 n.19. What is not noted there, but should be noted here, is that this time has passed.
On the one hand, Iowa no longer authorizes the imposition of capital punishment. See DEATH
Row, supra note 35, at 1. On the other hand, the statutory basis for the rejection of this
practice by South Dakota's courts, see Krauss, supra note 13, at 25 n.86, has disappeared;
under current law, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN., §§ 23A-20-12, 13 (1978), the practice seems to
be flourishing, see, e.g., State v. McDowell, 391 N.W.2d 661 (S.D. 1986).
42. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 4 n.14. This is not the case with respect to juries that
merely make sentencing recommendations. Id.
Professor Gillers has suggested that, as Justice White said twenty years ago, see Wither-
spoon, 391 U.S. at 541-42 (White, J., dissenting), states are free to attempt to increase the
reliability of capital sentencing juries' selection decisions by eliminating the requirement that
death verdicts be unanimous. See Gillers, supra note 1, at 89-90. The Supreme Court's cavalier
rejection of the claim that defendants have a constitutional right thereto, see Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 208-20), in the face
of both tradition and a widespread current practice of jury sentencing in capital cases, reinforces
my belief that Professor Gillers is right. Cf. infra notes 45, 63 & 115.
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in favor of death. 43 As a result, a death sentence should be imposed only
when the"community" is of one mind about the propriety of executing a
defendant.44
Given that each member of a capital sentencing jury is to make his
selection decision according to his own personal values, the jury can
effectuate the wishes of either "community" (i.e., the local non-AVADs or
the people of the state as a whole) only if the twelve people on it can fairly
be regarded as a microcosm of that "community. ' 45 Capital sentencing
procedure, relying as it does on this "mirror" model of representative
decisionmaking, presumes that these jurors can fairly be so regarded. But
there are two reasons for regarding this notion as questionable. 46
43. With respect to the effect of a capital sentencing jury's inability to agree upon a
unanimous verdict, see Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 n.9; Gillers, supra note 1, at 16-17. Since
Spaziano surveyed the states' laws, Missouri has empowered judges to determine defendants'
sentences in the event of jury deadlocks, see Mo. Ray. STAT. § 565.030(4) (1986), and
California has ordained that a second (and possibly a third) jury consider a defendant's
sentence before mercy becomes mandatory, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West 1988).
Finally, a jury's inability "to reach a verdict [in the selection phase of a capital case in
Kentucky] results in a mistrial and permits the matter to be retried." Skaggs v. Commonwealth,
694 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130 (1986).
44. A death verdict may therefore be presumed consistent with the will of the majority of
the statewide populace. Conversely, when any member of a death-qualified jury objects to a
death sentence, one cannot assume that a majority of the statewide "community" would
support such a sentence (he may be an AVAD who escaped detection at voir dire, see infra
note 62 and accompanying text, but he may also represent a segment of the non-AVAD
element of this society without whose support the pro-death penalty faction constitutes a
minority view, see infra note 57), and so it makes sense that it cannot be imposed. Indeed, it
would seem that any attempt to retain death-qualification and abolish the unanimous verdict
requirement would be of dubious constitutionality. No state has sought to use such a procedure,
although Florida does allow death-qualified juries to make sentencing recommendations by
non-unanimous vote. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 4 n.14. The Supreme Court has affirmed
the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme on several occasions, see Spaziano,
468 U.S. 447; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), but it has never addressed the legitimacy of this particular aspect of Florida's sentencing
procedure.
45. Twelve-person juries are used everywhere juries are given a role in the capital sentencing
process. Gillers, supra note 1, at 63 n.298. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the
Supreme Court indicated that the Constitution would permit the use of smaller juries in this
context. Id. at 103. Its later decision in Spaziano, 467 U.S. 447 (discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 208-20), suggests that it has not changed its mind. Cf. supra note 42.
However, because the Court has not authoritatively spoken on the question, it remains an
open one.
46. With the exception of obscenity cases, juries are called upon to represent their
"communities" in the manner of the mirror model whenever they are used. See infra note
189 and accompanying text. The model would be open to the same basic criticisms whenever
juries are asked to decide issues with respect to which society is divided. However, because
the consequences of an erroneous death sentence are so great, these defects could have a
constitutionally greater significance in this context. For a sample of the many special consti-
tutional rules the Supreme Court has promulgated in recognition of the fact that "death is
different," see, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2710-11 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476
U.S. 28 (1986); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 913 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (listing
cases).
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First, there is the problem of small numbers. A randomly chosen group
of twelve people is simply not likely to be a cross-section of a heterogeneous
community, and the gap between theory and reality will grow as the
community becomes more diverse.47 Even within the more narrowly defined
local "community" mentioned above, there is likely to be substantial
disagreement in many cases about whether the defendant should be exe-
cuted. 41
In any event, these juries are not products of truly random selection. On
the one hand, disqualifications, exemptions, and excuses distort the makeup
of American juries generally. 49 They effectively remove police and firefight-
ers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other occupational groups from the jury
system in most jurisdictions. ° In addition, they often lead to the gross
underrepresentation of other groups, including the young and the elderly.5'
Nonetheless, these general practices are not meant to affect the jury's ability
to express the "community's" views on whether defendants deserve to live
or die, and there is no reason to suppose that they have any systematic
effect on its ability to do so. 52
The same things could not be said about the use of death-qualification
to strip capital sentencing juries of AVADs.5 3 The very purpose of this
47. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 822 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Bell, Determining Community
Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202, 1207 (1977); Gillers, supra note 1, at 93. On the relationship
between jury representativeness and jury size, see Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernable"
Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MiCH. L. Rav. 643 (1975).
48. This assumption underlies a number of Supreme Court rulings on issues relating to the
death penalty. It explains why, as the Court reaffirmed in Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648(1987), the erroneous for-cause excusal of a would-be capital sentencing juror due to his
reservations about the death penalty cannot be regarded as harmless error. See Krauss, supra
note 19, at 555-60. It is also one factor that led to the Court's refusal to condemn Georgia's
capital sentencing scheme on the basis of statistical evidence of racially-based sentencing
disparities. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-96, 311-12.
49. See generally J. VAN DYK, JURY SELEcION PROCEDURES 111-37 (1977).
50. See id. at 126-31.
51. See id. at 35-39, 112, 123-24. One other factor contributes to the underrepresentation
of young people: They are often simply not adequately represented' on the lists from which
venires are typically drawn. See Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection,
76 MICH. L. Rsv. 1045, 1045-47 (1978).
52. Cf. Lempert, supra note 47, at 664-65.
53. Still further complications are added when peremptory challenges are taken into account.
Peremptories are challenges which may be made "without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220(1965). On peremptory challenges generally, see 2 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 35, §
21.3(d); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 145-51. Although they need not do so, every Americanjurisdiction makes a limited number of peremptories available to both sides in criminal cases.
See Krauss, supra note 19, at 537. As both sides get to make them, the net result of allowing
peremptories may be to make juries more representative by removing the "extremes of partiality
on both sides." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. However, where these "extremes" are not evenly
balanced, either in the general population or simply on the venire, peremptories may also have
the opposite effect. On the legitimacy of using peremptory challenges to remove capital
sentencing jurors because of their views about the death penalty, see infra note 62.
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practice, it will be recalled, is to make it possible for juries to implement
the penal policy favored by the legislature, and thus inferentially by the
statewide "community." However, as Professor Stephen Gillers has shown,
the assumption that the existence of state laws authorizing executions means
the statewide "community" thinks some capital murderers deserve to be
executed is problematic.5 4 Politics5  and the enormous difference between
supporting executions in the abstract and sentencing real human beings to
die make the legislature a dubious barometer of public opinion regarding
its acceptability.m Indeed, it was a concern about the reliability of legisla-
tively-expressed judgments about capital punishment, in part, that led the
Supreme Court to ban mandatory death sentences and to rule that sentencers
must be free to give "independent mitigating weight" to "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ' 57
These considerations militate against culling AVADs from capital sen-
tencing juries and in favor of permitting those juries to determine which,
if any, eligible defendants the statewide or local populace truly wishes to
execute. Yet this procedure would not be risk free, either. It might allow
local AVAD minorities to frustrate the will of local majorities in individual
cases .5 And it might prevent the statewide implementation of a statewide
"community's" penal policy by juries making selection decisions in the
traditional (i.e., "free agency") manner.59
54. See Gillers, supra note 1, at 69-74; Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional
Accuracy at the Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 1037, 1052-60
(1985).
55. Cf. infra note 202 and accompanying text.
56. For a forceful argument that the massive legislative response to Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), see infra note 159, did not basically reflect the states' feelings about the
acceptability of capital punishment, see F. Znanumr & G. HAwNs, supra note 35, at 38-45.
57. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
Even if enabling legislation may be taken authoritatively to express statewide majority
opinion with respect to the legitimacy of the death penalty, it does not establish that this
group is of one mind with respect to the proper resolution of the selection issues in each and
every case. Because non-AVADs are not clones, minority segments of that "community,"
taken together with the AVADs, may constitute a majority of the statewide "community" on
the question whether a particular person deserves to die. Death-qualification is supposed to
bar this kind of coalition-building in the jury room, but the ubiquitous unanimity rule
theoretically offsets this by enabling a single member of the majority group to veto any death
sentence. But see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
58. This problem would not be completely avoided by doing away with the requirement
that death verdicts be unanimous since the law of small numbers dictates that juries cannot
be expected truly to mirror the makeup of the population. Thus, if 40% of a populace were
AVADs, AVADs would constitute the majority on many capital sentencing juries. See Gillers,
supra note I, at 93 n.426; Lempert, supra note 47, at 669, 671 n.84.
59. This point is neglected in Professor Gillers' analysis of the constitutionality of excluding
AVADs from capital sentencing juries, see Gillers, supra note 1, which considers neither the
possibility nor the significance of disagreements between statewide and local "communities."
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However, the practice of branding AVADs unfit to serve on capital
sentencing juries solves these problems only to a limited extent. Where AVADs
are a majority of the local populace, this practice is supposed to override
their will. Where they are in the minority, it does not eliminate their power
to obstruct the local majority's will. Most potential capital sentencing jurors
have never made a similar decision in their lives. Hence, they are unlikely to
know how they would respond, as sentencers, to the facts of real cases. 0
(They may even be unwilling to make an honest public guess.61) Consequently,
judges are unlikely accurately to identify AVADs at voir dire,62 and some
60. People who have served on capital sentencing juries may be just as ignorant of how
they would respond if called upon to do so again. Those who felt compelled to vote for life
in one real case may not know if they would be willing to vote for death in another, more
egregious, case. Others, having voted for death in one case, may at some level wish they had
not done so, and may never be able to.do so again.
One recent study suggests that self-described AVADs would in fact be unwilling to vote
for a death sentence in any case. See Seltzer, Lopes, Dayan, & Canan, The Effect of Death-
Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 How. L.J.
571, 605-06 (1986). However, the significance of this survey is unclear. The respondents were
not actually called upon to make a real life-or-death decision. Further, it is not clear whether,
when asked how they would vote in several hypothetical cases, they were reminded of their
obligation to "follow the law" and "consider the death penalty" or provided with the type
of gruesome factual details likely to characterize (and affect the outcome of) real capital
murder trials. Finally, the researchers do not report the extent to which they found that jurors
who said that they were not AVADs were really capable of voting for a death sentence. (With
respect to the possibility that self-proclaimed non-AVADs will actually prove to be AVADs,
see Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida
Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. Cams. L. 1, 34-38 (1988).)
61. Professor Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's research into the fear of isolation suggests that
some jurors may lie about their views at voir dire in order to appear to hold "community"
values. See E. NOELLE-NEiumANN, Tm SPnLu OF SLENCE (1984). Professor Craig Haney's
empirical study of the process of death-qualification supports this theory. His research indicates
that death-qualification not only conveys a strong sense that the prosecutor, the judge, and
the law think well of the death penalty and ill of its opponents, but that it may actually cause
jurors to make capital sentencing decisions contrary to their personal preferences. See Haney,
On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8
LAw & HuM. BERAV. 121 (1984); Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of
the Process Effect, 8 LAw & HuM. BEaAv. 133 (1984). (Other jurors, who would automatically
vote to execute any eligible defendant, may also lie about their views in order to enable
themselves to serve on a capital sentencing jury. Cf. supra note 40.)
For evidence (albeit from non-capital cases) that some jurors really do dissemble at voir
dire, see 1 A. GinoaR, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL & CRiMINAL TRLAs § 8.81 (2d ed. 1984), and
Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 503, 510-15 (1965),
which are discussed in V. HANs & N. VEDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 69 (1986). For additional
experimental evidence that jurors may give dishonest responses at voir dire in order to try to
please the presiding judge see E. KRAuss & B. BONORA, JuRywoRK 2-20 (2d ed. 1987).
62. The same is true of counsel, so AVADs who are not excused for cause may not be
struck peremptorily, either. (I have previously argued that the prosecution should not be
allowed peremptorily to challenge prospective capital sentencing jurors on account of their
views concerning the death penalty if those views do not render them challengeable for cause.
See Krauss, supra note 19, at 536-44. Five Justices rejected this position in Gray, 481 U.S.
648. See id. at 671-72 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2062 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However,
Justice Powell's discussion of this point was arguably dictum since his vote did not turn upon
his resolution of this issue. The issue may therefore still be open.)
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AVADs presumably sit on these juries and block the return of death verdicts
supported by the majority. 63
Beyond this, the removal of these minority voices from the jury room
may actually impair the jury's ability to ascertain the true wishes of the
non-AVAD majority4 Determined opposition to capital punishment may
lead an AVAD to discover some otherwise unnoticed factor which may
persuade others to vote to spare the defendant in the case at hand.65 Or his
presence may encourage other jurors to adhere to their own sense that, for
whatever reason, a death sentence would be inappropriate. 6 The one thing
we cannot do is presume that an AVAD's counsel would be ignored by
other jurors, that a jury which would be 12-0 in favor of death in his
63. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 60, at 34-38. While the states are probably free
to abandon the requirement that death verdicts be unanimous, see supra note 42, the legitimacy
of states both taking this step and retaining the practice of disqualifying AVADs would seem
much more doubtful. See supra note 44. It should also be noted that some relatively non-
vengeful non-AVADs are doubtless also excluded from capital sentencing juries as a result of
judges' inability to predict accurately how people would behave if forced to make a capital
sentencing decision.
64. The textual discussion assumes that it is proper for the State to implement procedures
designed to enable juries to override minority opposition to laws or punishments. The Supreme
Court's validation of death-qualification, see, e.g., Wainwright, 469 U.S. 412, and of the
disqualification of prospective jurors opposed to other laws, see Krauss, supra note 13, at 56
n.231, shows that it thinks this is a legitimate State interest. However, the Court has never
explained how this view, or these practices, can be squared with the principles underlying the
federal constitutional requirements that a jury be selected from the district in which the crime
occurred, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and from a source representing a fair cross-section of the
community, see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975). Nor has it tried to harmonize death-qualification with the honored Anilo-American
tradition of jury nullification, with respect to which see Krauss, supra note 13, at 56 n.231.
(For an argument that the constitutional vicinage rule was adopted in part so that local juries
would be able to nullify federal laws, see Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 801, 840-43
(1976), 30 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 85-91 (1977).) Finally, the question how death-qualification can
be reconciled with the vicinage rules included in state constitutions also remains unexplored.
65. Extensive research has been done on the effects of death-qualification on the perform-
ance of juries in the guilt/innocence phase of capital cases. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162; id.
at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These studies support the claim that juries shorn of AVADs
may misunderstand or overlook evidence pertinent to the capital sentencing decision. For
example, one study suggests that AVADs perceive evidence differently than non-AVADs. See
Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Prone-
ness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAw & HuM. BEH~v. 95 (1984). Another
indicates that juries that have not been death-qualified are "more critical [than death-qualified
juries] in their evaluations of the witnesses" who appeared in court, Cowan, Thompson, &
Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on
the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & Htm. BEHAv. 53, 75 (1984), and that their members
"remember the evidence better than the members of death-qualified juries," id. at 76. However,
the latter study found "no significant differences by juror attitudes in the rate of [memory
for evidence] errors favoring defense or prosecution." Id. at 71.
66. There is evidence that the presence of an ally increases the odds that a dissenter will
stick to his guns. See H. KALvEN & H. ZasaL, THE AimmcAN JuRy 462-63 (1966); Lempert,
supra note 47, at 673-79.
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absence would vote 11-1 in his presence-it might just as easily be split 6-
6, or it might vote 7-5 or even 12-0 in favor of life. 67
This, then, is the situation with respect to capital sentencing juries:
Although it is clear that the goal of capital sentencing procedure is to bring
the majority's will to bear on the life-or-death selection question in individual
cases, and that the law regards the legislature as the authoritative voice of
the statewide majority will for these purposes, it is not clear that the law
correctly identifies the relevant "majority," or that the mirror model
employed in these cases can reliably achieve this goal. These points should
be borne in mind during the analysis of the representational model used
when juries are asked to make selection decisions in obscenity cases, to
which I will now turn.
B.
In obscenity cases, each juror is supposed to vote on the selection issues
as a "delegate," and the law presumes that jury verdicts reflect the "com-
munity's" sentiments on these questions. Individual jurisdictions enjoy
considerable discretion as to the selection of the "community" to be
represented in this manner,68 and a number of different approaches are
currently being taken. In some jurisdictions, the "community" whose stan-
dards are to govern the resolution of the selection questions is not specified
by law. 69 In others, juries are supposed to identify and express the views
of a particular "community," which may be the vicinage from which their
67. Cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360-62 (1972) (presuming majority jurors will
listen to reasonable arguments of minority jurors where non-unanimous verdicts are allowed);
Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1972) (plurality opinion) (same); Lempert, supra
note 47, at 651, 670 (although guilt/innocence decision generally may be determined by jurors'
pre-deliberation views, presence of one black juror may influence verdict).
68. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the "community" whose standards are to
be applied in making these decisions may be left undefined, see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153, 157 (1974) (dictum); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974), and thatjurors may be directed to identify it as the vicinage from which they were drawn, see id. at
104-06, or some larger domain. The use of a statewide community was upheld in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In fact, the Court has not barred the practice of declaring the
Nation to be the relevant community. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 n.11(1977) (reserving judgment on legitimacy of using nationwide standard). (Quaere why national
standards need not govern the determination of first amendment claims when they are the sole
basis upon which fourth amendment "reasonable expectation of privacy" claims may bejudged, see California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).)
69. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.010 (Vernon Supp. 1988). Although the Court has
suggested that the failure to specify a "community" is the same as identifying the "community"
with the vicinage, see Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104-06, there is no particular reason to suppose
that this is how instructions of this type are, or how states intend them to be, understood.
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members are drawn7 ° or some larger region, up to and including the state. 71
In one respect, obscenity juries are supposed to serve as the vox populi
in a stronger sense than their counterparts in the capital sentencing context.
The legislature is regarded as the authoritative voice of "community"
sentiment about whether anyone should be executed. Hence, the disquali-
fication of AVADs is said to be necessary to enable juries to effectuate the
"community's" will, and jurors are directed to consider the facts in aggra-
vation and mitigation in deciding whether an eligible defendant lives or
dies.
In obscenity cases, however, legislative judgments are given no such
deference. In this setting, the Supreme Court has ruled that legislation
cannot definitively fix "community standards." 7 2 Thus, juries must be free
in the selection phase of an obscenity case to decide whether legislative
decisions about the regulation of pornography accurately reflect the "com-
munity's" standards.73 In addition, prospective jurors may not be quizzed
70. This appears to be what is expected of jurors in obscenity prosecutions under federal
law. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104-06. (The federal judicial district is the vicinage from which
jurors must be drawn when a prosecution is brought in a federal court. 2 W. LAFAvE & J.
IsRAEL, supra note 35, § 21.2(e).) This is also expected of juries in several states. See, e.g.,
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-15-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
71. See, e.g., Aim. Rav. StAT. ANN. § 13-3501(2)(a) (Supp. 1987). With respect to the
legitimacy of using the standards of any "community" other than the vicinage, see supra note
64.
72. This is the clear teaching of Smith, 431 U.S. 291. The issue in Smith was what effect
Iowa's decision to deregulate the distribution of pornography to adults should have in a federal
prosecution for mailing obscene material from one point in that state to another. The Court
held that the state legislature's laissezfaire policy was not conclusive proof that the community
regarded nothing as "patently offensive" or as having "prurient appeal." Overlooking the
simplest justification for taking such a position on the facts of this case, see supra note 26,
Justice Blackmun went out of his way to emphasize his belief that "the question of the
community standard to apply, when appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness are
considered, is not one that can be defined legislatively." Smith, 431 U.S. at 303. Although it
is not clear whether Justice Powell agreed with this portion of Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court, id. at 309-10 (Powell, J., concurring), Justices Brennan and Marshall's continuing
adherence to the view that "obscenity" is protected speech, see, e.g., id. at 310 (Brennan,
Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), means that Justice Blackmun effectively spoke for the
Court on this question. Also see infra note 228.
73. One cannot infer anything about a community's values from the existence (or the lack)
of an obscenity statute unless the law was enacted (or rejected) by a legislature representing
the identical "community." If that condition were met, given the value of the free flow of
protected "speech," the chance that the legislature may have erred in its assessment of the
"community's" values, passed the law to please narrow special interest groups, or written it
with too broad a brush might well be too great to allow legislatures authoritatively to fix
"community standards." However, the same risks exist with respect to capital sentencing laws.
Why, then, does the law regard legislation as conclusively establishing that the public accepts
the death penalty?
Whatever the reason for this difference in the respect accorded to legislative judgments on
these two subjects may be, there is one thing which can be said with considerable certainty:
The Court's suggestion that negligence law provides support for its refusal to defer to legislation
in obscenity cases, see infra note 175 and accompanying text, is unjustified. See infra note
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about their impressions of the "community's" standards,74 and so they may
not be disqualified for giving a "wrong" answer. As long as a venire
member is willing to try to decide the selection issues as its "delegate," his
sense of the "community's" standards will not affect his fitness for service. 75
Just whose views this means obscenity juries are supposed to represent is
unclear. In particular, it is not clear whether a work should be considered
obscene in the absence of a perceived social consensus (as opposed to a
majority opinion) that it is such. 76 The Supreme Court has not decided
which view is correct as a matter of constitutional law, and typical jury
188. Beyond this, I can only suggest that this may be another reflection of our legal system's
(if not our society's) greater interest in executing people convicted of murder than in convicting
pornographers. Cf. supra note 32.
74. The published reports do not indicate that any party has ever been allowed to inquire
into prospective obscenity jurors' perceptions of the community's standards. However, such
inquiry has been condemned in several cases. See, e.g., Smith, 431 U.S. 291; United States v.
Thomas, 613 F.2d 787 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
75. Nor will a juror's personal feelings about pornography disqualify him under these
circumstances. See, e.g., Tidmore v. City of Birmingham, 356 So. 2d 231 (Ala. Crim. App.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); State v. Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc., 412 So. 2d
594 (La. 1982).
The Supreme Court has justified the bar against probing jurors' impressions of "community
standards" on the ground that "community standards" are not amenable to "precise defini-
tion." Smith, 431 U.S. at 308. See infra text accompanying notes 176-77. This rationale is
intimately related to the Court's views on the limits of legislative competence in this area.
After all, if "community standards" are ineffable, it stands to reason that legislatures cannot
fix them via statute. Cf. Smith, 431 U.S. at 302. And if representative legislatures cannot
authoritatively identify "community standards," why should judges, in their capacity as triers
of juror fitness, be able to do so? Cf. infra note 228.
But the law's refusal to qualify prospective obscenity jurors on the basis of their pretrial
impressions of "community standards" would be justified even if we were to assume that they
could verbalize those impressions and that judges could determine their accuracy at voir dire.
This is because jurors may change their minds about what the "community standards" are as
a result of the evidence adduced at trial and the observations of their fellow jurors. Unlike
the standards by which selection decisions are supposed to be made in capital sentencing
proceedings, the substance-indeed, perhaps even the existence, see supra note 29 and accom-
panying text-of a "community's standards" is an ultimate question of fact in an obscenity
case, and so a juror's pre-trial impressions of those standards should not be a valid basis for
his disqualification. (Nor should a venire member's confessed ignorance of those standards.
See Smith, 431 U.S. at 296-97, 308 (affirming refusal to ask if jurors knew them); cf., e.g.,
United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (trial judges
need not have personal knowledge of them). But cf., e.g., United States v. Elkins, 396 F.
Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (lack of personal knowledge renders California jury inherently
incapable of determining "community standards" of Northern District of Iowa, even with
assistance of expert testimony).)
Of course, the parties do have a chance to try to influence a jury's sense of the relevant
standards by peremptorily removing venire members whose socio-economic status, group
affiliation, or personal background (e.g., their familiarity with and feelings about sexually-
oriented books, magazines and films) suggest that they might hold views favorable to the other
side. See generally OBscEaNr AND Tam LAW 135-41 (PLI CnumAL LAw AND PRACTICE COURSE
1974); F. ScHAuER, supra note 21, at 253-64; Project, An Empirical Inquiry Into the Effects
of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 810, 921-22 (1977).
76. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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instructions finesse the question by speaking in terms of "the community's"
standards.77
Either way, this representational model calls upon obscenity juries to
make a very different kind of judgment than capital sentencing juries are
directed to make. Whether delegate voting can reasonably be expected to
result in jury verdicts reflecting "community" values turns largely on the
capacity of jurors accurately to gauge public opinion and on their willing-
ness, in the event of conflict, to subordinate their personal preferences to
their duty to vote as delegates. Accordingly, in order to test the validity of
this model, it is necessary to examine the psychology of the delegate voter.
Generally speaking, "[o]pinions depend on prior beliefs held and addi-
tional information received. ' 78 This common-sense notion is, of course,
equally applicable to opinions about the public's opinion of the "patent
offensiveness" and the "prurient appeal" of erotica. A juror's ultimate
opinions about these "community standards" should therefore be the prod-
uct of three factors: his own preconceptions about "the views of the average
person in the community ' 79 (the juror's "priors"), 0 sociological data ad-
duced by the parties at trial, and other jurors' preconceptions (their priors),
which may be discovered during the jury's deliberations.
Most of us have not studied meticulous empirical research on how our
"community" feels about erotica. In fact, anyone who has become learned
in this wisdom would doubtless be unavailable for jury duty in an obscenity
case, since he would be serving as a consultant or an expert witness for
one of the parties. Thus, a juror's priors must inevitably be opinions"1
grounded in his own experiences in and of that "community" and anything
that he may have heard about it second-hand.
There is one portion of the "community" whose views about a work's
"patent offensiveness" and "prurient appeal" each juror is certain to know.
Everyone knows whether he finds an erotic work to be "patently offensive"
or to have "prurient appeal." Even if the standards underlying our prefer-
ences cannot be articulated,2 we all "know it when [we] see it."83 However,
this is not the case with respect to our judgments about how public opinion
would view these matters.
77. See, e.g., the jury instructions cited in note 34, supra.
78. Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis, We Can't Disagree Forever, 28 J. EcoN. TnmoRY 192,
192 (1982).
79. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104.
80. "Priors" is a term used in social science literature to signify a person's initial beliefs.
See, e.g., Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis, supra note 78.
81. The classic examination of the distinction between knowledge and opinion is found in
Plato's Meno.
82. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 300.
83. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Consider the problems involved in gauging the moral pulse of the group
we know the best: our family, friends, and associates. We may never have
heard some of these people express any opinions about the "offensiveness"
of pornographic material.14 Others may have spoken in generalities, which
would force us to guess about whether, and to what extent, they were over-
generalizing. Still others may have aired their thoughts about the "offen-
siveness" of particular works. But even then we would have to speculate
as to what they would say about the material at issue in the case at hand.
Would they see it as materially different from what they had previously
assessed? Did their earlier pronouncements even represent their honest
beliefs, or were those remarks merely made in order to make our interlo-
cutors seem more normal, or macho, or cultured?85 Beyond that, had the
speakers known that their words would affect the decision of a real court
case, would they have thought more carefully about their views or how
they expressed them? Would they have had a definite opinion about the
"patent offensiveness" of those works? And would they still hold the same
views today?
The difficulties can only increase when we try to identify a "community's"
sentiments. How closely, one must ask, does the "community" resemble
my little corner of the world? Do any of the public opinion polls of which
one may have heard reveal the true beliefs of the "average" person in this
"community?" 86 Can those views be inferred from what one sees in the
media? To what extent do the media cater to the tastes of the "average"
person, as opposed to children, or elite groups of "hypersensitive" or
"cultivated" adults? To what extent do they pay attention to the tastes of
this "community" at all?7
As has already been noted, jurors' priors are not based on anything
resembling current "hard" sociological research on these matters. So where
do they come from? How do we estimate public opinion under conditions
of uncertainty? And how good are we at making these attributions?
Although little is known about how people go about deciding what other
people think, empirical studies of social perception demonstrate the limited
nature of our talents in this area. One of the most salient findings in the
84. Although the same things might also be said about the "prurient appeal" prong of
the obscenity selection decision, for the sake of simplicity, the discussion in the text will focus
on "patent offensiveness."
85. Cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text; infra note 107.
86. See infra note 107.
87. With respect to the geographic orientation of the media, see UhIaner & Grofman, The
Race May be Close But My Horse is Going to Win: Wish Fulfillment in the 1980 Presidential
Election, 8 POL. BEHAv. 101, 117, 121 (1986). On the relationship between the media and
public opinion generally, see, e.g., D. GRABER, MAss MEDIA AND AumiucAN PoLmcs (2d ed.
1984); E. NOELLE-NEumANN, supra note 61; Tichenor & Wackman, Mass Media and Community
Public Opinion, 16 Am. BEaAv. Sc. 593 (1973).
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social science literature is that we tend to project our own views onto
others. In the words of one of the leading articles on the subject, "Laymen
tend . . . to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively
common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative
responses as uncommon, deviant, or inappropriate." 8
That is not to say that people are entirely insensitive to reality. There is
evidence that this attribution bias sometimes diminishes when we learn that
the relevant "others" are different from ourselves. For example, a study
of voters' predictions of the outcome of the 1980 presidential election reveals
that each candidate's supporters were sensitive (as a group) to variations in
the preferences of local electorates. 9
However, the fact that one attributes "different" views to others does
not guarantee that he has correctly identified their beliefs. With respect to
some types of issues, people may see themselves as holding opinions different
from others because they wish to perceive themselves as superior.9 Beyond
this, research indicates that, with respect to a wide range of issues, we
simply do not know what other people-be they our spouses, our peers,
our neighbors, or the public-think. 91 Indeed, one authority has recently
opined that our lack of accurate information about other people's attitudes
is so great that, even when we know that an "other" does not share our
beliefs, we would often come closer to the truth by projecting our beliefs
onto it than by trying to guess what its beliefs are.92
88. Ross, Greene & House, The 'False Consensus Effect". An Egocentric Bias in Social
Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 279, 280 (1977).
On projection generally, see, e.g., Ross & Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process:
On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEulsrncs AND BIASES 129 (D. Kalneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky eds. 1982);
Campbell, Similarity and Uniqueness: The Effects of Attribute Type, Relevance, and Individual
Differences in Self-Esteem and Depression, 50 J. PEPS. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 281 (1986); Davis,
Hoch & Ragsdale, An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Spousal Predictions, 13 J. CouNs.
REs. 25 (1986); Fields & Schuman, Public Beliefs About the Beliefs of the Public, 40 PuB.
OPINION Q. 427 (1976); Hoch, Perceived Consensus and Predictive Accuracy: The Pros and
Cons of Projection, 53 J. PERs. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221 (1987); Mullen, Atkins, Champion,
Edwards, Hardy, Story & Vanderklok, The False Consensus Effect: A Meta-analysis of 115
Hypothesis Tests, 21 J. EXPERW NTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 262 (1985); Sherman, Chassin, Presson
& Agostinelli, The Role of the Evaluation and Similarity Principles in the False Consensus
Effect, 47 J. PERs. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1244 (1984); Sherman, Presson & Chassin, Mechanisms
Underlying the False Consensus Effect: The Special Role of Threats to the Self, 10 PERs. &
Soc. PsYcHoLoGY BuLL. 127 (1984); Tetlock & Levi, Attribution Bias: On the Inconclusiveness
of the Cognition-Motivation Debate, 18 J. EXPERENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 68 (1982); Uhlaner
& Grofman, supra note 87.
89. Uhlaner & Grofman, supra note 87.
90. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 88, at 291; Fields & Schuman, supra note 88, at 446.
91. See, e.g., Davis, Hoch & Ragsdale, supra note 88 (spouses); Fields & Schuman, supra
note 88 (neighborhood, residents of same city); Hoch, supra note 88 (spouses, peers, public);
O'Gorman, Pluralistic Ignorance and White Estimates of White Support for Racial Segregation,
39 PuB. OPInoN Q. 313 (1975) (inhabitants of same "area"); O'Gorman & Garry, Pluralistic
Ignorance-A Replication and Extension, 40 PuB. OPINION Q. 449 (1976).
92. See Hoch, supra note 88. See also Davis, Hoch & Ragsdale, supra note 88.
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At the very least, these considerations suggest that people often misjudge
public opinion. Though this may seem more likely to occur when a "com-
munity" is divided on an issue, pluralistic ignorance93 has also been observed
with respect to matters on which a social consensus exists.Y On the other
hand, it is important to emphasize that our social perceptions are not always
wrong. 95
One further point merits attention. The more segmented the"community,"
the greater the odds that an individual's impression of its public opinion
will be erroneous. 96 Common sense suggests that the more closely one is
connected with the various groups in a "community," the more likely he
is to be capable of accurately gauging how it feels about divisive issues. 97
Conversely, the greater the extent to which a "community" is split into
isolated segments or subcultures, the less likely its members are to have a
sound picture of its views.
These general psychological and epistemological observations are quite
consistent with our fragmentary knowledge about social perceptions of
the "patent offensiveness" of pornography. There is evidence that some
people believe their personal opinions on this subject are shared by most
people in their community," and that others believe they hold minority
93. This term is used in social science literature to describe the condition that exists when
"the majority agrees but thinks that there is disagreement." Scheff, Toward a Sociological
Model of Consensus, 32 Am. Soc. REV. 32, 39 (1967). This phenomenon has been the subject
of a number of studies. See, e.g., Breed & Ktsanes, Pluralistic Ignorance in the Process of
Opinion Formation, 25 PuB. OPmoN Q. 382 (1961); Fields & Schuman, supra note 88;
O'Gorman, supra note 91; O'Gorman & Garry, supra note 91; and Taylor, Pluralistic Ignorance
and the Spiral of Silence: A Formal Analysis, 46 PuB. OPNON Q. 311 (1982). Also see E.
NoELL-NEumANN, supra note 61, at 124-27, 168-69, and Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck:
Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 576-77 (1988).
94. A number of striking examples of this phenomenon have been noted in research on
social perception of attitudes about race relations. For example, one study found that, while
76% of the sample group of white Detroiters felt that black children should be allowed to
come into white friends' homes to play, only 1/3 of the group believed this to be the majority
opinion in Detroit, and just under 40% thought it was the majority view in their own
neighborhoods. See Fields & Schuman, supra note 88. Similar findings were made in O'Gorman,
supra note 91, and O'Gorman & Garry, supra note 91.
95. See, e.g., E. Nomux-NEumANN, supra note 61, at 9-16.
96. See id.; Fields & Schuman, supra note 88; O'Gorman & Garry, supra note 91; Uhlaner
& Grofman, supra note 87.
97. See supra text accompanying note 96. For an analysis of some of the implications of
this phenonemon with respect to the structure of a "representative" legislature, see Feld &
Grofman, Toward a Sociometric Theory of Representation: Representing Individuals Enmeshed
in a Social Network, in TowARD STRucTuRAL SOcIoDyNmAusS (M. Kochen ed. 1988).
98. Forty-four percent of the respondents in a national survey conducted in 1970 for the
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography said that they thought their personal views on
the availability of erotica were shared by the majority of the people in their communities. See
U.S. COMM'N ON OBSCENT AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE RmORT OF Tm ComanssION ON OBscEmrrY
AND PORNOGRAPHY 354 (1970) [hereinafter REPORT]. Several commentators have suggested that
social perceptions about "patent offensiveness" are often the result of projection. See, e.g.,
Herrman & Bordner, Attitudes Toward Pornography in a Southern Community, 21 CRuss-
NOLOOY 349, 363, 371 (1983); Lockhart, supra note 32, at 552.
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views. 99 In addition, there is every indication that American society is to
some extent segmented with respect to obscenity, i.e., that different groups
have different perceptions of public opinion. 100 Moreover, there is evidence
that these perceptual differences can be substantial. 0 1 Finally, the one
published study examining this question shows that the difference between
a "community's" views on "patent offensiveness" and the views its
members believe it to hold can also be substantial. 02 There is thus good
reason to doubt the accuracy of juror preconceptions about what "com-
munity standards" are. 10 3
Jurors may be provided with sociological evidence of the "community's"
standards at trial,"04 but that does not eliminate this problem. Trusting that
99. Forty-one percent of the respondents in the survey mentioned in the previous footnote
said they held minority views on the extent to which erotica should be available. See REPORT,
supra note 98, at 354. Researchers have also found a dichotomy between personal standards
and perceived "community" standards in a more recent study of attitudes regarding pornog-
raphy. See Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98, at 358-59. With respect to the possibility that
claims to holding minority views on the "patent offensiveness" of erotica may reflect people's
wish to see themselves as superior to others, see Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures,
and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REv. 291, 300 (1974).
100. Empirical studies suggest various demographic groups in our society have different attitudes
with respect to erotic material. Gender, see Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98, at 359-62;
Mosher, Psychological Reactions to Pornographic Films, 8 TEcmUcAL REPORT OF Tm CoMMSSION"
ON Oascmirrv A PoR orRAPHY 255 (1970), occupation and educational level, see Herrman &
Bordner, supra note 98 (education); Higgins & Katzman, Determinants in the Judgment of
Obscenity, 125 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY 1733 (1969) (both), religiosity, see Amoroso, Brown, Pruesse,
Ware, & Pilkey, An Investigation of Behavioral, Psychological, and Physiological Reactions to
Pornographic Stimuli, 8 TEcHmqcA REPORT OF Tim COMMIsSION ON OscE n AND PORNOG.pHY
1 (1970); Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98; Wallace, Weluner, & Podany, Contemporary
Community Standards of Visual Erotica, 9 TtcHNIcAL REPORT OF THE COMssIMON ON OBSCENY
AND PoRNOc;PnsPHY 27 (1970), age, see Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98, and race, see id.,
have all been found to correlate with opinions about pornography. See also Wallace, Obscenity
and Contemporary Community Standards: A Survey, 29 J. Soc. Issus 53 (1973). Almost all of'
these factors have also been found to correlate with perceptions of "community standards"
regarding erotica. See Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98. (This study did not investigate the
relationship between occupation and assessment of "community standards.") There is also
evidence that community size and type (.e., city center or suburb) correlate with attitudes towards
pornography. See Glassman, Community Standards of Patent Offensiveness: Public Opinion
Data and Obscenity Law, 42 PuB. OPMON Q. 161 (1978).
101. One study found that 9007o of the people surveyed in one residential neighborhood of
a city thought community standards had recently become more tolerant of explicit cinematic
sex, whereas half of the respondents in another such neighborhood felt that the change had
gone in the opposite direction. See Bell, supra note 47, at 1206.
102. See Herrman & Bordner, supra note 98, at 358-59.
103. Indeed, if "community standards" is taken to refer to a set of standards that are
shared by the "community," see supra note 28 and accompanying text, there is evidence that
they may not exist in many communities. See, e.g., Daniels, The Supreme Court and Obscenity:
An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional Policy-Making, 17 SAN DINGo L. REv. 757, 779-86
(1980); Wallace, supra note 100.
104. Although the Constitution does not require the prosecution to produce any evidence
of the community's standards, the Court has said that defendants "should be free to introduce
appropriate expert testimony" on the subject. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
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juries may already know "the views of the average person in the commu-
nity," the Court has held that prosecutors need not introduce such evidence,
and that jurors may reject any evidence of "community" values that is
presented in court simply because it conflicts with their presuppositions
about what the "community's" sentiments are.10 5 Given the well known
human tendency to retain one's belief in his priors in the face of evidence
of their falsity,106 it is likely that this type of evidence will often fail to
persuade jurors to abandon their erroneous presuppositions about what the
"community" thinks. 107
Finally, there is the input of the other jurors. This type of evidence of
the "community's" views is obviously available in every obscenity case tried
before a jury. Perhaps, as the eyewitness testimony of known individuals
with no apparent vested interest in the outcome of the litigation, these
reports may be more persuasive than the parties' statistics.108 But this would
In fact, expert testimony is commonly used by both parties in obscenity cases. See Project,
supra note 75, at 922-24. Surveys are another frequently used form of evidence concerning
community standards. See, e.g., J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERLLAs 118 (1985); Marks, Inside Perspective On Obscenity Appeal, 29 VA. L. WEEKY
8 (1976); Project, supra note 75, at 923 n.513. Finally, there is what Professor Schauer has
called "[o]ne of the most often attempted, and most rarely successful, methods of presenting
evidence of contemporary community standards[,] ... the use of materials comparable to
those on trial." F. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 133. See generally Lentz, Comparison Evidence
in Obscenity Trials, 15 U. MICH. J.L. RaF. 45 (1981).
105. Hamling, 418 U.S. 87; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973). The
Court has not foreclosed the possibility that there might be an extraordinary case in which
such evidence would be necessary. See, e.g., id. at 56 n.6.
106. For a cognitive psychologist's perspective on why this should happen, see Ross &
Anderson, supra note 88, at 144-51.
107. I do not mean to imply that deference to sociological evidence would eliminate the
possibility of error. In the first place, evidence speaking directly to the "patent offensiveness"
of the work challenged in the case at hand may be inadmissible. See Brigman, The Controversial
Role of the Expert in Obscenity Litigation, 7 CAP. U.L. REv. 519, 542-43 (1978). Even if this
were not so, empirical research is not an infallible index of a community's values. A survey
may not reflect the community's true views because of improper sampling, reagent confusion
about the meaning of the questions asked, or dishonest or erroneous responses. (The significance
of dishonest responses to questions about respondents' personal opinions is explored in E.
NOELLE-NEumANN, supra note 61. Although that study suggests that the likelihood of dishonest
answers to survey questions might be reduced by asking subjects about "community standards"
rather than their own views, this type of questioning would open the door to incorrect answers,
which would be a particularly acute risk if "pluralistic ignorance," see supra note 93 and
accompanying text, exists with respect to "community standards.") Evidence of sales of the
same or some "comparable" work may also be inconclusive. What, for example, is the
significance of the fact that few, or thousands of, copies of the challenged work have been
sold in a city of millions? And who is to say whether the "comparable" work is truly such?
108. There is evidence that "[p]ersonal contact may carry much more weight than indirect
sources of information." Uhlaner & Grofman, supra note 87, at 121-22. See, e.g., Nisbett,
Borgida, Crandall & Reed, Popular Induction: Information is Not Necessarily Informative, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEuRisncs AND BIASES, supra note 88, at 111-16; Uhlaner
& Grofman, supra note 87 at 121-22. However, there is also evidence that cases are almost
always decided before jury deliberations begin. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEisx, supra note 66,
at 482-90. (For further information about the process of jury deliberation, see, e.g., V. HANS
& N. VIDmAR, supra note 61, at 97-112, and R. HAsnE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INsIDE
TaH JuRY (1983).)
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not necessarily increase the accuracy of jurors' social perceptions. Particu-
larly if the "community" has an inaccurate perception of its own views,
none of the jurors may know its true feelings. Alternatively, jurors who do
have a correct opinion on this subject may defer to other jurors claiming
superior, or at least different, knowledge.
By the end of the jury's deliberations, however, some jurors may have
an accurate sense of what the "community" would consider "patently
offensive." If one of these jurors does not share the "community's" views
on this subject, would he be willing to vote to effectuate the "community's"
values, as required by law? Can we reasonably expect instructions directing
jurors to make their selection decisions as delegates to affect how these
jurors vote?
The answer to these questions seems clear: "Sometimes." It should be
noted first that people who express an unwillingness to do so may be
challenged for cause before trial. Some people who will not vote as delegates
surely escape detection at voir dire, become jurors, and refuse to do as
they are told. 109 Still, it seems reasonable to suppose that many people will
be willing to subordinate their personal opinions to their duty as jurors.110
As Professor Robert Weisberg has observed,"' Stanley Milgram's famous
demonstration of people's willingness to inflict electric shocks on innocent
subjects suggest that people would be willing to compromise their moral
convictions in far more serious ways than this if the authorities so com-
mand.1 12
At this point, we have considered the capacity of obscenity jurors to
make selection decisions according to the "community's" standards and the
109. Cf. supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
110. There is anecdotal evidence that instructions have actually led some jurors to make
selection decisions contrary to their own preferences in obscenity cases. See Hayes, A Jury
Wrestles With Pornography, 10 Am. LAw. 96, 99-100 (1988); Schwartz, The TV Pornography
Boom, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1981, § 6 (Magazine) at 44.
On the other hand, it should also be noted that a study conducted a few years after the
Miller decision suggests that some litigators believe confused jurors often ignore their instruc-
tions altogether and decide cases according to their own personal sense of who should win.
See Project, supra note 75, at 913-14. This may well be the case. However, it is difficult to
resist the temptation to question the basis for this speculation. Had the litigators discussed
these matters with former jurors, or were they merely relying on their "gut instincts"? If the
latter, did they take adequate account of the phenomenon of projection? And might their
speculation have been tinged by at least a little bit of professional snobbery? Unfortunately,
we cannot tell, as the published results of this study do not answer these questions, and the
raw data upon which the report was based have been lost.
111. See Weisberg, supra note 10, at 391-92.
112. The phenomenon of jurors voting against their personal preferences seems to be common
in the law. See Lempert, supra note 47, at 673 n.90. Also see supra note 61. However, a
juror who votes against his personal preferences may nonetheless remain faithful to himself,
as it has been suggested that people have group-oriented, as well as individually-oriented,
drives. See, e.g., H. MARGoLis, SELFIsmESS, ALTRuism, & RATioNA~rry: A TEoRY op SocmA
CHOICE (1984).
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likelihood of their following the law in the event that the "community's"
preferences differ from their own. Nonetheless, our assessment of the
delegate voting scheme is not yet complete because the ultimate question
with respect to the validity of this representative jury decisionmaking scheme
concerns the performance of juries, not individual jurors. That question,
again, is how well juries can express the "community's" sentiments when
they make selection decisions as delegates.
Intuitively, twelve randomly selected jurors would seem likely to constitute
a rather more reliable barometer of public opinion than any single juror.
In particular, the presence of additional jurors would appear to reduce the
risk that a juror's grossly aberrant conception of the "community's" views
would be given legal effect." 3 Moreover, by pooling jurors' individual
perspectives, juries might be able to identify the "community's" true
attitudes even though none of the jurors has an accurate impression thereof.
However, there is also another side to this coin. As has already been
noted, jurors who have a correct opinion of their "community's" sentiments
may be persuaded that they do not. They may also yield to other jurors'
pressure and vote for what they correctly regard as incorrect verdicts. 114 On
the other hand, an obstreperous juror might refuse to yield to his fellow
jurors and hang a jury on which correct opinion otherwise prevails.'"
Finally, if the members of a particular jury do not represent a sufficiently
broad spectrum of the "community" to enable the jury, as a group, properly
to assess the "community's" standards, attempts to fashion a composite
picture of the "community's" attitudes may result in still another kind of
attributional error.1 1 6 While these factors may not systematically bias juries
113. Cf. M. SACKS & R. HAsTm, SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CouRT 82 (1978) (citation omitted)
("twelve jurors are more accurate than six jurors for the same reason that twelve thermometers
are more accurate than six thermometers: they cancel out random errors").
114. See supra notes 66, 112. See also Smith, 431 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Cf. supra note 66. The Constitution does not require that guilty verdicts in criminal
cases litigated in state courts be unanimous, and the situation with respect to federal courts is
unclear. See Krauss, supra note 13, at I n.6. Nevertheless, few states allow less-than-unanimous
convictions, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 209, and unanimity is required in the federal
courts pursuant to FED. R. Ciui. P. 31(a).
Civil verdicts, like their counterparts in criminal cases, traditionally could be returned only
with the unanimous consent of the jury. See F. JAMts & G. HAzARD, CWvM PROCEDURE 451
(3d ed. 1985); J. FpIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MLER, Crv-M PROCEDURE 525 (1985). Jury
decision rules in civil cases tried in state courts are determined entirely by state law, see F.
JAms & G. HAzARD, supra, at 452, and many states have abrogated this rule. See id. at 451-
52; J. FRMDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MiLLER, supra, at 526; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at
286-89. It is not clear whether the seventh amendment comprehends a unanimity requirement
in federal civil trials, see J. FRiEDENTHAL, M. KAm, & A. MiL.ER, supra, at 526-27, but that
remains the practice in the federal courts unless the parties have consented to the return of a
majority verdict pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 48. See J. VAN DY IE, supra note 49, at 286.
116. A jury may also project its own collective view of the "prurient appeal" and "patent
offensiveness" of the work at bar onto the "community." Were a jury to proceed in this
manner (and I am aware of no empirical evidence that obscenity juries do, cf. supra note
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in any one direction, they clearly indicate that the delegate voting model
will not invariably bring about selection decisions in obscenity cases that
reflect actual "community" preferences, and that the gap between expec-
tations and performance can be expected to widen with the segmentation
and heterogeneity of the "community." 117
III.
The law expects juries to bring public opinion to bear on the moral
questions lying at the heart of the selection phase of obscenity cases and
capital sentencing proceedings. Yet it tells them to go about doing this in
very different ways in these two contexts. How can we account for these
diverse procedures?
It is to this issue that I now turn. I will first consider whether there is
any theoretical justification for using different representational models in
these settings. Finding no clear reason to prefer having jurors make selection
decisions in either context as delegates or free agents, I will then explore
the historical basis for the current dichotomy in voting rules. In the final
analysis, this inquiry will lead me to propose that the Supreme Court
renounce Miller's insistence that jurors be told to apply "community"
standards in obscenity cases.
A.
In principle, the choice of which decisional model to use in a specific
type of case should turn upon the importance of error-minimization in that
setting and the relative reliability of the alternatives. Neither consideration
offers any solid support for the status quo.
The consequences of an inaccurate expression of community sentiment
are significant in both contexts. An erroneous death sentencing decision
takes a life that should have been spared or deprives the community of the
110), it is not clear how (beyond the use of confusing instructions) this decisional model would
differ from the mirror model. As such, this procedure would be susceptible to error due to
the previously mentioned shortcomings of the mirror model. The accuracy of "community
standards" determinations of obscenity juries operating in this manner would be impaired still
further if, as has been suggested, jurors may be unwilling to voice their true opinions in the
jury room. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. supra notes 61, 107.
117. The fact that jurors do not decide cases in isolation, but as members of a body that
deliberates and makes decisions as a group, means that we cannot assume that mathematical
models of group decisionmaking like the Condorcet jury theorem, about which see, e.g.,
Grofman & Feld, Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 AM. POL. ScI.
Rnv. 155 (1988), apply to real jury decisionmaking. See Grofman & Owen, Review Essay:
Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future Research, in INFoRMATIoN POOLING AND GROUP
DEcISIoN MAKING: PROCEEDNoS OF THE SEcoND UNrvEsrrY OF CAIoRNIA, IRvIN, CoNER-
ENCE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 99-100 (B. Grofman & G. Owen eds. 1986).
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retributive and deterrent value of executing a convicted murderer. An
improper application of the community's standards in an obscenity case,
on the other hand, may reduce the availability of expressive material to
which the Constitution guarantees free access or expose the community (at
least temporarily) to material that is thought not only to lack serious
"redeeming" value, but also to be morally and socially corrosive.'
Hence, great care must be taken to maximize the likelihood that accurate
selection decisions will be made in both contexts. However, error-minimi-
zation is plainly more important in capital sentencing than in obscenity
cases. The injustice of executing someone whom the State does not truly
wish to kill simply cannot be compared to that involved in fining or
imprisoning a vendor of an erotic work which enjoys the protection of the
first amendment. Not only does a mistaken execution implicate the para-
mount value of human life-the damage done to first amendment values
by the latter type of error is unlikely to be irretrievable, since a mistaken
obscenity conviction typically will not result in the final disappearance of
the wrongly-condemned material. It may well be commercially available
elsewhere, 119 and the Constitution guarantees that any privately held copies
may be retained for private viewing. 20
The law recognizes these facts, and so it takes greater care to ensure the
accuracy of death verdicts than of obscenity verdicts.' 2 ' For example, every
state that delegates capital sentencing decisions to juries uses twelve person
juries for this purpose and allows the return of death verdicts only with
the jurors' unanimous consent.122 No comparable consensus exists with
118. An erroneous acquittal on criminal obscenity charges may be remedied in subsequent
civil proceedings. See J. FRIMENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. M1iLER, supra note 115, at 664-65. It
is also possible for a defendant who defeats an obscenity action brought under state law to
be sued under federal law, or vice versa. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-94 (1985);
F. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 220-22.
119. Material found obscene in a case involving one vendor may still be obtainable from
non-party vendors in the same jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions, both in this country and
abroad.
120. See supra note 31. Nor is an erroneous acquittal in an obscenity case necessarily
irretrievable. See supra note 118.
121. Indeed, the special need for reliability in this context has led to the creation of a set
of constitutional rules unique to capital cases. See supra note 46. Thus, even if the mirror
model is sufficiently reliable for use in making judgments with strong moral overtones in other
settings-for example, distinguishing first from second degree murder-it would not necessarily
be reliable enough for making the life-or-death decision in a capital sentencing proceeding.
Compare Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182-83 (1986) with id. at 197 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
122. See supra note 45, note 42 and accompanying text. It is not clear that either practice
is constitutionally mandated. See id. However, the fact that the states have chosen to retain
them shows the value they place on accuracy in jury sentencing in capital cases. (With respect
to the relationships between jury size and unanimity, on the one hand, and accuracy, see V.
HANs & N. VmA, supra note 61, at 165-76; M. SACKS & R. HAsrm, supra note 113, at 75-
88.)
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regard to obscenity cases; indeed, the cases in which the Supreme Court
has been called upon to consider the constitutionality of five-person juries
and conviction by a 5-1 vote were obscenity cases. 123
Still, the unique importance of error-minimization in death sentencing
does not explain why the law attempts to ascertain the community's views
on selection issues in different. ways in these two contexts. On the one
hand, the odds of any given jury being a microcosm of the community
with respect to the question of a particular defendant's just deserts would
seem no different from the odds of its being a microcosm of the same
community in regard to the question of any given work's "patent offen-
siveness." 12 The story with respect to the delegate voting model is somewhat
more complicated, but the bottom line seems to be the same.
Given the extensive public debate about capital punishment, both as an
abstract proposition and in the context of specific murder trials, ordinary
people may well have heard more people express opinions about defendants'
just deserts than about the "patent offensiveness" of sexually oriented
material. However, it is not clear how this would affect our relative
competence at estimating public opinion on these two subjects because the
reliability of the former class of out-of-court expressions of personal opinion
may be lower than that of the latter. Although some dishonest remarks
would probably be made on both subjects,12 people intuitively seem less
likely to know how they would react when faced with the task of sentencing
a real defendant convicted of committing a specific murder than with a
selection decision in an obscenity case. 26 Moreover, judgments about de-
fendants' just deserts may be somewhat more factbound than judgments
about what expression is "patently offensive."1 27 Finally, personal qualms
about executing a particular defendant (or anyone at all) might create a
greater risk that jurors would defy their instructions and vote their personal
preferences if delegate voting were used in capital sentencing proceedings
123. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (conviction by 5-1 vote unconstitutional);
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (criminal trial before five-person jury unconstitutional).
124. See supra note 84. Polling data indicate that there is a broad range of views on
pornography and capital punishment. Compare, e.g., ATToRNEY GENERAL's CoMMISSION ON
PORNoGRAPHY, FN'AL REPORT 927 (1986) (results of 1985 NEwsw EK-Gallup survey on toler-
ation of sales of erotica to adults) with THE GALLUP REPORT, Report Nos. 232-33, 3-11 (Jan./
Feb. 1985) (results of 1985 Gallup survey on capital punishment).
125. See supra note 61. There is no reason to assume that dishonesty is more common in
one context than the other.
126. This would obviously reduce the probative value of sociological evidence-e.g., a
survey-of the community's sense of the appropriate sentence in any given case. (Of course,
it is quite doubtful that the facts of the case could accurately be described to the respondents
in such a survey. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985).)
127. This would be another reason to discount empirical evidence of the community's general
attitudes about capital sentencing, as opposed to proof of their application to the precise facts
of the case at hand. See also supra note 126.
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than exists when jurors are asked to decide whether someone should be
fined or imprisoned for selling a particular work.
Even assuming, arguendo, that these considerations make the use of
delegate voting less attractive in capital sentencing than in obscenity cases,
they do not explain why it should be deemed superior to the mirror model
in the latter setting, but not the former. At the very least, that would
require some reason to expect delegate voting to produce a more accurate
picture of the community's conscience in obscenity cases than the mirror
model. But no such reason exists.
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical research has been done on
the relative accuracy of these mechanisms for expressing public opinion.
Indeed, reliable empirical data on the subject may be unobtainable.'2
Therefore, it is necessary to compare the two models in terms of how
common sense would suggest they would function as barometers of com-
munity sentiment in obscenity cases.
This comparison reveals no demonstrable basis for regarding delegate
voting as more accurate than the mirror model in this context. A petit jury
is not likely to be a real cross-section of the community, but the diversity
of juror backgrounds is also critical to the successful implementation of the
delegate voting model. In light of the additional uncertainties generated by
the requirement that jurors try to implement the community's will rather
than their personal preferences, it is simply not clear that this costly game
is worth the candle. 29 If this is so, the state and federal governments should
128. People may not respond the same way in a survey or an experiment as they would as
jurors in a real case because they may not have had the opportunity to hear other people's
arguments or because they may not deliberate as carefully as they would if their vote would
determine the outcome of a trial. If, as the Supreme Court has suggested, see Lockhart, 476
U.S. at 168-73, this risk is substantial, reliable empirical data would be unobtainable. But see,
e.g., Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231-43; id. at 246 (Brennan, J., concurring). (The reliability of
statements about personal preferences with respect to obscenity, like any other controversial
topic, may also be questionable due to the threat of dishonesty. See supra notes 61, 107, 125.)
129. To put it somewhat differently, it is not clear that the risk of sampling bias exceeds
the risk of erroneous public perception. (With respect to the question of cost, see infra note
130.)
Several additional points must be made. First, there are two aspects of the risk of sampling
bias: the general deficiencies of the mirror model and, where the "community" is statewide,
the risk that the vicinage is nonrepresentative. The former impediment to a jury's expression
of the community's sentiments via free agency voting could be reduced by abandoning the
traditional rule, see supra note 115, that verdicts must be unanimous. The latter, which is
mitigated by death-qualification in capital cases, see supra notes 35-67 and accompanying text,
can be truly redressed only by delegate voting, if at all. In any case, since the State is free to
make the local populace the legally relevant "community," why should the Court forbid it
from presuming an identity between local and statewide sentiments? (If capital sentencing
juries are supposed to speak for statewide "communities," see supra notes 35-42, it can be
only on the basis of such a presumption.)
Second, sampling bias is not the only factor that may affect the accuracy of selection
decisions made according to the mirror model. The impact of jury decision rules must also be
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be free to use whichever of these two models they prefer for the resolution
of the selection issues in their obscenity cases, and Miller should, to this
extent, be overruled.13°
B.
If anything is to be said for the difference in how the law directs juries
to make selection decisions in these two settings, the courts have not said
it. In fact, it may well be the product of an historical accident or a bad
analogy. The discussion that follows will explain why this is so.
1.
The prohibition of obscenity is a fairly modem development in Anglo-
American law.'3 ' Initially, the definition of obscenity-that is to say, the
taken into account. Although a popular majority (and thus a majority of a truly representative
jury) might share a common view of a work's "prurient appeal" or "patent offensiveness,"
jury decision rules could prevent the return of a verdict reflecting that preference. Assume,
for example, that 60% of the relevant "community" felt a book was "patently offensive."
Assume further that 7.2 of the 12 jurors did, too. If the Constitution forbids a jury to return
a conviction on a 7-5 vote (our fractionalized juror deciding to go with his predominant
feelings about the case), see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Blackmun, J,
concurring), criminal juries could implement the majority's view only through delegate voting.
(The Constitution does not prescribe decision rules for civil jury trials in state courts. See
supra note 115. As to civil jury trials in federal courts, see J. F tENTHAL, M. KANE, & A.
MMLER, supra note 115, at 527.)
Of course, it is not clear whether the first amendment would allow the repression of
pornographic material whose "selection" is not supported by a community consensus. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text. Nor is it evident that a delegate voting rule is a
legitimate form of vote dilution as a matter of sixth amendment law. Cf. supra note 44.
Nonetheless, even if the State were free to use a delegate voting system to effectuate the
majority's will under these circumstances, there is no reason why it should be barred from
using free agency voting and foregoing a conviction (or a civil judgment) in such a case.
Finally, while the presence of a greater degree of consensus within the "community" would
obviously increase the likelihood of an accurate expression of "community" views when the
mirror model is employed, see, e.g., Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, Culture as Consensus: A
Theory of Culture and Informant Accuracy, 88 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 313 (1986), it is not
clear whether this would be equally true when a delegate voting procedure is used. See supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
130. The principle of stare decisis does not militate strongly against this conclusion. The
proposed deregulation would harm no one. However, it would save the parties and the courts
the expense and the trouble of collecting and evaluating evidence on public opinion in obscenity
cases. See supra note 104. Moreover, the relative merits of these two models for jury
decisionmaking were not discussed by the Court (or the parties) in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), its predecessors, or any of its progeny. See infra text accompanying notes 131-
52. Finally, to the extent that the Miller Court thought the delegate voting rule simply requires
obscenity jurors to make the type of decision jurors are routinely called upon to make in
negligence cases, the rule was unjustified from the start, and its legitimacy has been further
undercut by the Court's more recent decision in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). See
infra text accompanying notes 170-94. (With respect to the limits of stare decisis in constitutional
cases, see generally Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National
League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMENTARY 123 (1985); Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art"
of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211.)
131. For an overview of obscenity law prior to Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957),
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scope of this ban-was purely a matter of statutory interpretation or the
elaboration of the common law. In Regina v. Hicklin, 132 a landmark English
case decided in 1868, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn declared that a work is
obscene if its "tendency" is "to deprave and corrupt" its most vulnerable
potential viewers. 33 This doctrine quickly crossed the Atlantic and won
widespread acceptance in American courts. 3 4
Taken at face value, Hicklin limited adults to seeing matter fit for
children. This was too much for Learned Hand, so he fired the opening
salvo in the war against it. 35 Although he felt obligated, as a district court
judge, to follow Hicklin in United States v. Kennerley, 36 he proposed that
"obscenity" be defined in terms of "the average conscience of the time.' ' 37
In time, most American courts took up this suggestion and declared that
a work's effect on the "normal" or "average" person is critical to the
determination of its obscenity. When, as in the leading case of United States
v. One Book Called "Ulysses, ,'3s judges were the triers of fact, this may
naturally have led them to see their job as requiring them to estimate how
the challenged material would affect "a person with average sex instincts.' ' 39
The legal system's general assumption that juries represent their communities
in microcosm,140 which was already widely reflected in the use of free agency
voting by capital sentencing juries,' 4' would seem to have rendered delegate
voting a much more dubious necessity in jury trials of obscenity cases.
Nonetheless, the delegate voting requirement was imposed, without com-
ment, upon jurors, as well as judges. 42
In 1957, these questions took on a very different character, as the Supreme
Court began to constitutionalize obscenity law. The Court held the "most
and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), see F. SCHATER, supra note 21, at 1-30;
Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L.
REv. 295, 324-50 (1954).
132. [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 359.
133. Id. at 371.
134. F. ScatraR, supra note 21, at 15-17. Hicklin was commonly read as allowing a work's
obscenity to turn on whether any portion of the work, taken out of context, would have this
effect. This aspect of the English rule received similar treatment at the hands of American
courts as the "most susceptible person" rule. See id. at 15, 16, 26-28, 37.
135. Hicklin had previously been "quietly ignored" by a trio of New York cases. Lockhart
& McClure, supra note 131, at 326-27.
136. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
137. Id. at 121. If society was not willing to tolerate all expression "honestly relevant to
the adequate expression of innocent ideas," Hand suggested that "the word 'obscene' be
allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at
which the community may have arrived here and now." Id. at 120-21.
138. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff 'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
139. Id. at 184.
140. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
concurring), aff 'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1936);
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 131, at 340.
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vulnerable person" test unconstitutional in Butler v. Michigan'43 because
that test "reduce[d] the adult population ... to reading only what is fit
for children,'" 44 but Butler did not reach the question whether any prohi-
bition of obscenity could be reconciled with the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and press. Four months later, in Roth v. United States,'45
the Court decided that obscenity, which it defined as "material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest," 1 falls beyond the
protection of the first amendment. Moreover, it declared that "prurient
appeal" could not be judged by a "most vulnerable person" test. Rather,
the Court summarily announced, "the proper standard" is what it charac-
terized as the dominant view in the lower courts. 47 According to the Court,
this standard required judges and jurors to ask "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the [challenged] material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." '' 4
When later decisions made it clear that material must be "patently
offensive" as well as appealing to "prurient interest" in order constitution-
ally to be considered obscene, 49 the Court indicated that this quality, too,
is a function of a community's values. 50 Moreover, the Justices seem once
again reflexively to have assumed that juries should identify community
sentiments by delegate voting."' In any event, they have insisted that jurors
resolve these selection issues in this manner. 52
But why should delegate voting, rather than free agency, be employed in
this context? The courts have not answered this question, perhaps because
it has never been asked.'53 Perhaps the carryover of delegate voting from
143. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
144. Id. at 383.
145. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
146. Id. at 487.
147. Id. at 489, 491, 492. With respect to the question whether this really was the prevailing
test in the lower courts, see Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards'"
The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C.L. REv. 1, 5-6
(1978).
148. 354 U.S. at 489 (footnote omitted). See id. at 489-90. The Justices have long disagreed
about the limits that this standard was meant to place upon the regulation of pornography.
Compare, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 441-43 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting)
and Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-22 with Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (plurality
opinion) and Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 80-81 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 102-03.
150. See Schauer, supra note 147, at 9-13. See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-
66 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
151. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-05 (1977); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974); Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-34; Smith, 361 U.S. at 165-66 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); id. at 171-72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. See Pope, 481 U.S. 497; Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1978). See
also supra note 151; note 34.
153. Supreme Court Justices have identified two purposes of the delegate voting requirement.
See infra note 201. However, both goals could be achieved by juries making selection decisions
as free agents.
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bench trials to jury trials is simply an historical accident that has gone
uncorrected because it has gone unchallenged in the courts.
2.
The history of the standards for identifying those eligible defendants who
deserve to die is quite different. When mandatory capital sentencing laws
were replaced by statutes providing for sentencing discretion,5 4 sentencers
were given no guidance as to how to make these decisions."' Hence, they
were forced to make them on the basis of their personal moral codes. 5 6
Nonetheless, capital sentencing juries (capital sentencing responsibility was
generally delegated to juries'57) were expected to express their communities'
values. 58
Despite the revolution in capital sentencing law that began with Furman
v. Georgia,59 the critical facts remain unchanged. A smaller class of people
is death-eligible than before, sentencing decisions are made after a separate
penalty trial, and triers may even be told to determine the fate of an eligible
defendant by weighing an exclusive list of "aggravating" circumstances and
154. This transformation began with Tennessee's abandonment of mandatory death sen-
tencing in 1838, and discretionary capital sentencing laws had virtually conquered the field by
1963. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 1-3.
155. See id. at 2-3.
156. Jurors were free to defer to the views of others, but they were bound to do so only
if their personal values required it. These things are essentially still true with respect to the
discretionary aspects of the capital sentencing process. Beyond this, I have been unable to find
a single case in which empirical evidence of the community's views on which, if any, eligible
murderers deserve to die has been admitted. Cf. State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 (1985) (clergyman's testimony on unacceptability of capital
punishment to Roman Catholics in community held irrelevant to capital sentencing decision).
Consequently, the only empirical evidence of the community's standards available to capital
sentencers is found in the capital sentencing laws themselves: e.g., statutory restrictions on the
circumstances that may justify the imposition of the death penalty, see supra note 12.
157. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 2 n.9.
158. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469-84 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-41 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6
comment 4 (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1958). This expectation may have been even less realistic
formerly than it is today. As one study has noted, "A strong legal commitment to representative
jury panels has . . .been relatively recent." V. HANs & N. VIDMAR, supra note 61, at 53.
See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 6-19, 45-76; cf.. F. JA.Ms & G. HAZARD, supra
note 115, at 453-55. Moreover, before Witherspoon, death-qualification may well have excluded
a broader class of prospective capital sentencing jurors apparently likely to vote for mercy
than it does today. See Krauss, supra note 13; Krauss, supra note 19.
159. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that the eighth amendment barred the execution of
anyone sentenced under the discretionary capital sentencing laws then in use throughout the
country. See Krauss, supra note 13, at 32. On the continuing aftershocks of Furman, see W.
WHirE, THE DEATH PENALTY N THE EIGrTIs (1987); F. ZIMnRIo & G. HAWKiNs, supra note
35; Weisberg, supra note 10.
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whatever "mitigating" circumstances may exist. 16° But even when sentencing
discretion is confined to this extent, the balancing process is left to each
juror's individual discretion, 16' and it is the presumption that juries are a
microcosm of the community that leads the law to view jury verdicts as
expressions of community values.
Seventeen years ago, Justice Brennan noted with evident concern that
juries which are expected to "express the conscience of the community"
about a defendant's fitness to live are not told to make that decision as
delegates. 62 This remark, which was little more than dictum in a dissenting
opinion, elicited no response from the other members of the Court, and
Justice Brennan himself no longer seems troubled by the use of the mirror
model in this context. 63 The reason for his apparent change of heart is not
known.' 64
However, four Justices have hinted that capital sentencers can not rea-
sonably be expected to make their selection decisions with reference to any
values but their own. 65 Surprisingly, the author of this suggestion was then-
160. With respect to the reduction in the number of persons who are death-eligible, see
supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. The use of bifurcated proceedings is discussed in
Krauss, supra note 13, at 3 n.14. Finally, the selection aspect of the capital sentencing process
is discussed supra at notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
162. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 302 & n.67 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Brennan was expressly commenting only upon the shortcomings of California's
jury instructions, it is hard to believe that he did not know (or has not learned) that this
"defect" was (and still is) equally present in all American capital sentencing schemes. See
Krauss, supra note 13, at 17 & n.60.
163. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 439-63 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 486-87 & n.33 (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He is, however, greatly troubled by the very existence of capital punishment,
which he and Justice Marshall regard as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi,
108 S. Ct. 1981, 1989 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
164. Of course, it is also possible that Justice Brennan has simply forgotten about this
issue, or that he has had bigger fish to fry in the Court's cases involving capital sentencing
juries.
165. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983) (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist's
remarks, in pertinent part, are as follows:
Any sentencing decision calls for the exercise of judgment. It is neither possible
nor desirable for a person to whom the State entrusts an important judgment to
decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences. The thrust of our decisions on
capital punishment has been that "discretion must be suitably directed and limited
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." ...
We have never suggested that the United States Constitution requires that the
sentencing process should be transformed into a rigid and mechanical parsing of
statutory aggravating factors. But to attempt to separate the sentencer's decision
from his experiences would inevitably do precisely that. It is entirely fitting for
the moral, factual, and legal judgment of judges and juries to play a meaningful
role in sentencing. We expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in their
own way and to the best of their ability. As long as that discretion is guided in
a constitutionally adequate way, and as long as the decision is not so wholly
arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment cannot and should
not demand more.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Justice Rehnquist, who has supported the requirement of delegate voting
on selection issues in obscenity cases ever since he joined the Court.
Moreover, his opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, both of whom had similar track records of support for community
standards voting in that context. 166 If these Justices really believed that
capital sentencing decisions can not be made by reference to transpersonal
standards, why did they think obscenity decisions can?
Justice Rehnquist did not answer this question. The case, Barclay v.
Florida,167 involved a defendant who attacked his death sentence on several
grounds. Among other things, Barclay charged that his sentence was arbi-
trary, and therefore unconstitutional, because it was to some extent based
upon the wartime experiences of the judge who imposed it. 168 Nevertheless,
Barclay did not propose that delegate voting was necessary, nor did he
point to the obscenity cases as an analogy. And it is not clear whether
anyone else even considered these arguments. While the Court upheld
Barclay's sentence, no other Justice said anything about the possibility of
requiring capital sentencers to make their decisions on the basis of a
transpersonal moral standard. 16 9
Thus, the difference between the way juries are expected to express the
community's sentiments in the selection component of obscenity cases and
capital sentencing decisions may be simply a result of the accidental failure
of the judicial system to notice its existence. But the courts' penchant for
analyzing "community standards" issues in obscenity cases in terms of
negligence law suggests another possibility: the bad analogy.
3.
From the beginning, courts have compared delegate voting to the use of
the reasonable person standard in negligence law. In Kennerley, the well-
166. Justice O'Connor, who also joined this opinion, has yet to vote on the legitimacy of
the requirement of delegate voting in the selection phase of obscenity cases. In Pope, 481 U.S.
497, she joined the majority in condemning the use of delegate voting on the "redeeming"
value question; but its use in the selection phase was not at issue in Pope, so her vote in that
case may not provide any insight into her views on the subject.
167. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
168. The murder of which Barclay was convicted was motivated by racial hatred. See id. at
942-44 (quoting Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1267-69 (1977)). The trial judge suggested
that this was an important factor in his decision, to sentence Barclay to death, and he noted
that his revulsion toward racial warfare was informed by his experiences as a soldier in World
War II, which included exposure to the Nazi concentration camps. See id. at 948-49 n.6.
169. Justices Stevens and Powell, who concurred in the judgment, felt that the judge's
conduct was unexceptionable because "[t]he sentencing process assumes that the trier of fact
will exercise judgment in light of his or her background, experiences, and values." Id. at 970
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). They seemed to recognize that this meant that sentencing
judges might not "express the community's conscience," id. at 970-71, but they intimated
nothing about whether they thought people capable of making capital sentencing decisions as
delegates, rather than free agents.
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spring of the "community standards" concept, Judge Hand opined that
"[if letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense
of what is right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish
the standard much as they do in cases of negligence. ' 17 0 Judge Woolsey
drew the same analogy in the Ulysses case, where he stated that
[w]hether a particular book would tend to excite such [sexual] impulses
and ["sexually impure and lustful"] thoughts must be tested by the
court's opinion as to its effect on a person with average sex instincts-
what the French would call l'homme moyen sensuel-who plays, in this
branch of legal inquiry, the same role of hypothetical reagent as does
the "reasonable man" in the law of torts and "the man learned in the
art" on questions of invention in patent law.171
Learned Hand returned to this theme three years later when he wrote that,
contrary to the teaching of Hicklin, "'obscenity' is a function of many
variables, and the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism
of which they are to find only the minor premises, but really a small bit
of legislation ad hoc, like the standard of care."' 172
Although obscenity law has become constitutional law, the negligence
analogy is still a staple of judicial discussions of "community standards"
issues. The Supreme Court has stated that there is a "close analogy between
the function of 'contemporary community standards' in obscenity cases and
'reasonableness' in other cases."' 173 In Smith v. United States, 74 the Court
relied on this analogy in explaining why legislation cannot authoritatively
define community standards. 75 Smith also upheld a trial judge's refusal to
ask venire members to state their impressions of their community's views
"relative to the depiction of sex and nudity in magazines and books"' 176 on
the ground that such a request "would have been no more appropriate than
a request for a description of the meaning of 'reasonableness.' Neither
[concept] lends itself to precise definition.' 17  In Hamling v. United States,78
170. 209 F. at 121.
171. 5 F. Supp. at 184.
172. Levine, 83 F.2d at 157.
173. Smith, 431 U.S. at 302. This language is part of a passage whose point is that the
Court had previously "recognized" this "close analogy" in the passage discussed infra at note
179.
174. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
175. Justice Blackmun's explanation for the Court, but see supra note 72, of why statutes
cannot have this effect consists of one sentence:
It would be just as inappropriate for a legislature to attempt to freeze a jury to
one definition of reasonableness as it would be for a legislature to try to define
the contemporary community standard of appeal to prurient interest or patent
offensiveness, if it were even possible for such a definition to be formulated.
431 U.S. at 302. But see infra note 188.
176. Id. at 296 n.4. The questions that the judge refused to pose are set forth in the
Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 296-97 & n.4.
177. Id. at 308.
178. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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the Court cited the negligence parallel in support of its decision that the
Constitution generally does not require the prosecution to present evidence
of community standards in obscenity cases.' 79 Finally, in Pinkus v. United
States, 180 it compared the difficulty of informing jurors of how they are to
approach selection issues in obscenity cases to the difficulty of framing jury
instructions in negligence cases.
Perhaps the courts have rejected free agency voting by jurors on the
selection issues in obscenity trials because they consider delegate voting
similar to what we ask jurors to do in negligence cases. If so, however,
they have erred.
Negligence involves the breach of a duty to use due care.'8' Jurors are
instructed to decide whether the duty of care has been breached by com-
paring challenged behavior to that of a reasonable person under similar
circumstances.1 12 While this means that the legal standard is not what the
jurors would have done under the circumstances, 183 these instructions do
179. The Court explained that proof of community standards is unnecessary because
[a] juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for making the
required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge of the
propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the law.
Id. at 104-05. By way of example, the Court cited a pair of negligence cases. See Comment,
The Jury's Role in Criminal Obscenity Cases-A Closer Look, 28 KAN. L. REv. 111, 128
(1979).
180. 436 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1978).
181. See W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTS
161, 169 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Liability, or a finding of contributory
negligence, also requires proximately caused harm. See id. at 162-63.
182. With respect to this standard, see generally L. GRE N9, JtDoE AND JURY 153-86 (1930);
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 181, § 32; Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference,
39 HARv. L. REv. 849 (1926); James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951); Reynolds, The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health
Report on the "Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. Rav. 410 (1970); Seavey, Negligence-
Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1927); Terry, Negligence, 29 HA.v. L. Rav.
40 (1915). Jury instructions typically refer to this hypothetical being as a "reasonable person
of ordinary prudence," although other verbal formulae to the same effect are also employed.
See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. ScHwARz, CASES & MATERIAIs ON ToRT S 151 (8th ed. 1988).
Finally, with respect to this creature's gender, see Collins, Language, History and the Legal
Process: A Profile of the "Reasonable Man," 8 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 311 (1977).
183. It is error to frame jury arguments or instructions in these terms. See, e.g., PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 181, at 175 & n.1l. After all, jurors might think they would have acted
with far too much or far too little caution, or that there would have been more than one
reasonable way to act, in any given situation. Still, jurors are not forbidden to conclude that
a reasonable person would respond as they would. Very little is known about how jurors
actually decide what reasonable care is. See L. GREEN, supra note 182, at 178 ("how any
particular jury arrive at their judgment is perhaps unknown even to themselves"); but cf.
Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of
Jury Instructions, 79 COLTM. L. Rv. 1306, 1349-50 (1979) (empirical study of how subjects
interpret California negligence instruction, "plain English" alternative); E. Green, The Rea-
sonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychosocial Reality?, 2 L. & Soc. REv. 241 (1968) (empirical
study of effects of typical instruction), reviewed in J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THm TORTS
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not require that jurors identify or effectuate "community standards." 184
Jurors may hold popular beliefs about which safety precautions are worth
taking, but they may also think their "community" to be behind the times
or just plain wrong about such matters, and their instructions direct them
to make reasonableness their guide. 85 The law trusts that this procedure
will generally result in verdicts that are consistent with "community"
values, 86 if such values exist, 87 but only because it places its faith in the
PROCESS 376-78 (3d ed. 1988). However, it is probably "inevitable that . . . jurors will still
be influenced by their own life patterns and roles in deciding what a reasonable man would
do." Reynolds, supra note 182, at 416; see E. Green, supra, at 255-56. Indeed, it has often
been said that the law submits questions of reasonable care to juries precisely because it
assumes jurors to be reasonable people. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 182, at 423; Terry,
supra note 182, at 47.
184. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291 comment d, § 292 comment b (1965);
Reynolds, supra note 182, at 423. As Professor Reynolds noted, "community standards"
instructions are "now being increasingly rejected even where used in the past, such as for
medical doctors." Id. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 181, at 187-88.
Of course, to the extent that professional custom fixes the standard of care for doctors and
other professionals, see id. at 185-89, the law does not ask jurors to make value judgments
about a defendant's conduct. Rather, for reasons of contract law or juror ignorance, see id.
at 189, negligence law refuses to allow the community at large to determine the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct (except insofar as it may shape professional custom by private
decisions made in the marketplace). Indeed, in medical malpractice cases where custom controls,
the law commonly seems unwilling to consider even the medical community's view of the
reasonableness of its customary conduct. (Doctors may regard some customary medical practices
as unreasonably risky or unduly cautious.) See, e.g., King, In Search of a Standard of Care
for the Medical Profession: The "'Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1236-
44 (1975). But see, e.g., Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1147, 1164 n.51
(1942).
On the one hand, it should be clear that the reasons for refusing to allow jurors to make
their own decisions about the reasonableness of medical care do not apply in obscenity cases.
On the other hand, the rejection of custom as the definitive measure of reasonable behavior
in negligence cases generally, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 181, at 193-96, further
liberates negligence jurors from the fetters of community standards of care.
185. With respect to the clarity of these instructions, see Charrow & Charrow, supra note
183, at 1349-50.
While public opinion may seem most likely to be considered unreasonable if the community
is a backwater town or county (torts scholars do not specify the "community" for which they
think juries generally are supposed to speak, cf. supra notes 35-41, 68-71 and accompanying
text), nationwide customs have been held unreasonable, see, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash.
2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), and a moment's reflection upon political issues would doubtless
reveal that each of us regards American public opinion as, in some respects, unreasonable.
186. See, e.g., O.W. HoLMs, THE Common LAw 110-11, 123-26 (1881); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 comment c (1965); James, supra note 182, at 4; Reynolds, supra
note 182, at 423-24; Seavey, supra note 182, at 4, 10-11. Again, the question which "com-
munity's" values negligence juries are thought to express is overlooked in the literature. See
supra note 185. In addition, the authorities recognize that negligence verdicts will sometimes
lead or simply contradict community sentiments. See O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 110-11; supra
notes 184-85 and accompanying text; cf. O.W. Homuss, supra, at 123 (judge may take
reasonableness issue from juries where public opinion divided).
187. The authorities appear to recognize that public opinion may be divided, and that jury
verdicts may thus be inconsistent. See O.W. HoLsMS, supra note 186, at 123; cf. Miller, 413
U.S. at 26 n.9.
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mirror model.188 Indeed, although the law regularly relies upon juries to
express community values in both civil and criminal cases, 18 9 obscenity cases
seem to be the only ones in which the mirror model is not used to accomplish
this.
Be this as it may, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged the funda-
mental difference between the reasonable person standard and delegate
voting in Pope v. Illinois.190 The issue in Pope was the constitutionality of
an instruction directing jurors to assess the "value" of allegedly obscene
works according to the standards of the people of Illinois. 191 The Court
held this instruction to have been constitutional error. Speaking through
Justice White, the Court ruled that a work's "value" must be assessed
from the perspective of the reasonable person rather than by reference to
"contemporary community standards." In the process, the Court rejected
the State's allegation that "a 'community standards' instruction . . . is the
functional equivalent of a 'reasonable man' instruction."' 19 Justice White
distinguished these two legal standards on the ground alluded to above:
That a "community standards" instruction obligates jurors to implement
"prevailing local views on value" even though they believe a reasonable
person would not share them. 93
188. The courts' comparison of delegate voting to tort law's reasonable person standard is
deficient in other respects, as well. Jurors' personal experiences are much more likely to have
given them a basis for making the normative judgment required in a negligence case than the
sociological judgments required in an obscenity case. Comment, supra note 179, at 132-34.
Moreover, the doctrine of negligence per se does allow legislatures to set a standard of
reasonable care. See generally, PRossER & KEETON, supra note 181, at 220-34; compare supra
note 175 and accompanying text. For further comments on the shortcomings of this analogy,
see F. SCRAUER, supra note 21, at 72-73.
189. See, e.g., Ballew, 435 U.S. at 229-43; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975);
G. CALABRsi & P. BOBBrrr, TRaoic CHoicEs 57, 63 (1978); O.W. HouMs, supra note 186,
at 110-11, 123-26. I do not advert here to the jury's power to nullify the law when it finds
the law inconsistent with community standards. (I have noted the Supreme Court's ambivalence
on the significance of this power in a previous article. See Krauss, supra note 19, at 555
n.214.) Rather, I am referring to the application of community values to the evidence presented
in court pursuant to its instructions. This is inherent in the resolution of every case: Perhaps
most obviously, it occurs when juries are called upon to make a moral judgment on behalf
of the community regarding the strength of the plaintiff or prosecutor's case (i.e., whether or
not the burden of proof has been satisfied).
190. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
191. See id. at 499 & n.2.
192. Id. at 501 n.3 (citing Brief for Respondent at 16).
193. Id. The dissenting Justices agreed that a jury might reach different conclusions about
a work's "value" depending on which of these standards it was told to apply, see id. at 1926
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and they were right to do so. But see Allen, Unexplored Aspects
of the Theory of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 33, 40-41 (1988). Suppose that
the people of the vicinage from which the jury was drawn overwhelmingly agreed that no
reasonable person could find "redeeming value" in a particular erotic work. Suppose further
that the members of the jury were sufficiently typical of the vicinage's inhabitants that, were
they asked to vote as free agents under a "reasonable person" instruction, the jury would
unanimously find the work to be "worthless." Still, were they given a "community standards"
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Thus, if Miller's requirement that jurors decide selection issues in ob-
scenity cases as delegates was based on the Court's perception that this is
analogous to what we ask jurors to do in negligence cases, the Court has
recognized the inaptness of this analogy and repudiated the theoretical
underpinnings of this aspect of its decision in Miller. Because delegate-style
jury voting is not a demonstrably superior means of ascertaining a "com-
munity's" sense of a work's "prurient appeal" or "patent offensiveness,"
that requirement, too, should be repudiated. 94
IV.
The resolution of selection issues in capital sentencing proceedings and
obscenity cases is not always entrusted to juries. When judges are asked to
make these decisions, they, like juries, are supposed to speak on behalf of
their communities in different ways in these two contexts. However, this
dichotomy differs from the one that exists when these matters are left to
juries, and so the reasonableness of the legal rules governing judicial
decisionmaking in these settings turns upon somewhat different considera-
tions than the reasonableness of the rules governing jury decisionmaking.
In a bench trial of an obscenity case, 19" the judge is to gauge the "prurient
appeal" and "patent offensiveness" of the work in question by the relevant
"community standards." Thus, the law seeks to minimize the extent to
which selection decisions will vary with the identity of the judge who makes
them. Indeed, by directing trial judges to vote as delegates, the law attempts
instruction, the same jurors might honestly conclude that the work had some "redeeming
value." There are two reasons why this could happen. On the one hand, the jury could
misread public opinion, even a consensus. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, as was true in Illinois at the time Pope was decided, the legally relevant
"community" may not be the vicinage from which the jury was drawn, but a larger entity
whose values the jury may rightly perceive to be different from the jurors'. (It is worth noting
that the Illinois courts have refused to find the use of their "statewide community" instruction
harmless error in at least one of the cases they have reviewed after Pope. See People v.
McGeorge, 156 I11. App. 3d 860, 110 Ill. Dec. 1, 510 N.E.2d 1032 (1987).)
194. In his concurring opinion in Pope, Justice Scalia called for a rethinking of the
"redeeming value" element of Miller's definition of obscenity. 481 U.S. at 504-05 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
195. There is no first amendment right to a jury trial in obscenity cases. Alexander v.
Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973) (per curiam). The sixth amendment does not create such a right
with respect to "petty" criminal cases, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), and a jury trial may be waived in "serious" criminal obscenity
prosecutions. But see Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Obscenity Prosecutions: A Sixth
Amendment Analysis for a First Amendment Problem, 50 FoRDHAn L. Rnv. 1311 (1982)
(arguing that obscenity prosecutions are inherently "serious"). The seventh amendment's
guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases, U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII, does not apply to the states,
see Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. McKeithen,
409 U.S. 943 (1972), but even if it did, it would not preclude bench trials in obscenity cases
seeking purely equitable relief.
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to reduce the risk that these decisions will vary with the type of tribunal
(i.e., judge or jury) assigned to make them.
The situation with respect to capital sentencing is entirely different. When
the responsibility for determining the fate of a death-eligible defendant is
entrusted to a judge, 9 6 that judge is expected to make the life-or-death
decision according to his own moral code. 197 This is also the job of capital
sentencing jurors, but a judge, unlike a multimember jury, is not expected
to voice a "community's" feelings. Rather, he represents the "community"
on whose behalf he makes his decisions in only one sense: He acts in its
name.
Because trial judges "collectively do not represent-by race, sex, or
economic or social class-the[se] communities, 1 98 it seems that the use of
free agent voting can only increase the risk that judge-imposed sentences
would be out of step with these communities' values. 199 Moreover, since
trial judges are unlikely to be of one mind about when capital punishment
is appropriate, this practice also heightens the risk that a defendant's fate
would turn upon the identity of the judge to whom his case was assigned. 2W
One of the principal reasons for requiring that obscenity selection decisions
be made in reference to "community standards" was that courts thought it
unwise to condition access to art or literature upon its being agreeable to
the personal standards of individual judges or juries.20' At first glance, given
196. There is no constitutional right to jury sentencing in capital cases. Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447 (1984). In four of the 36 states which allow capital punishment, capital sentencing
decisions are made by judges without any jury input. In four other states, judges make these
decisions after receiving the advice of a jury. See id. at 463 n.9; Gall v. Commonwealth, 607
S.W.2d 97, 104 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981). In one state, a panel of judges
is allowed to make the life-or-death decision if the sentencing jury is unable to agree upon a
verdict. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 n.9. In Missouri, the trial judge has this responsibility.
See supra note 43. In the other 27 states, defendants have a right to a jury determination of
their fate. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 n.9.
197. See supra notes 15, 156 and accompanying text.
198. Gillers, supra note 1, at 63 (footnote omitted).
199. As Justice Stevens has observed, "[The available empirical evidence indicates that
judges and juries do make sentencing decisions in capital cases in significantly different ways
.. " Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted).
200. Studies have revealed significant disparities between the sentences given out by different
judges in non-capital cases, see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON
TBE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 7-8 (1987); S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-46, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmin. NEws 3182, 3221-
29, and there is no reason to doubt that these disparities would be significant in capital cases,
as well.
201. See, e.g., Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1978); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). See also supra text
accompanying notes 131-53.
While the Court has repeatedly referred to its concern about the possibility of triers with
idiosyncratic sensibilities as the principal justification for requiring that selection decisions be
made with an eye to community standards, see, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
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the unique importance of reliability in capital sentencing, the use of the
free agency model to decide which eligible defendants deserve to die appears
equally ill-advised. After all, the one thing we can most safely assume about
trial judges is that they are unlikely to hold sentencing views similar to
those of "the average person in the community."21
Although the disparity between judicial and community values may not
be so troubling when other types of sentencing decisions are involved, this
would surely seem to be one respect in which "death is different." 23 Because
of its irrevocability, special care must be taken to make sure that the death
penalty is imposed only in appropriate cases. Of course, "appropriateness"
is in the eye of the beholder, but, under our Constitution, the community
would seem to be the only legitimate judge of whether an eligible defendant
deserves to live or die.? Therefore, if they have the ability to do so, it
107 (1974); Miller, 413 U.S. at 33, it has never mentioned any other reasons for this requirement.
However, Justice Harlan did suggest a second reason for requiring that "patent offensiveness"
be judged in this manner. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), he argued that this-
and a "patent offensiveness" component of the constitutional definition of "obscenity"-is
necessary because "[t]he community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue,
condemn that which it generally tolerates." Id. at 171 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 481-91 (1962)
(plurality opinion).
202. Judges, unlike jurors, are generally not subject to questioning before trial about their
attitudes towards capital punishment. See, e.g., Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 680 F. Supp. 867
(E.D. Ky. 1988); State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 741 P.2d 1223 (1987). Hence, there is no
analogue to death-qualification when judges are the capital sentencers. Still, since the law calls
upon capital sentencers to make selection decisions on the basis of facts adduced in court,
see, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), it appears that a judge who truly believes
that no one (or every eligible defendant) deserves to be executed could not properly make
these decisions according to his personal moral code. It is not clear how such a judge (or one
who is just not willing to impose a death sentence in any case) is supposed to react when
confronted with a capital prosecution.
Moving from theory to practice, I am unaware of any judges recusing themselves from
capital cases because of their feelings about the death penalty. Maybe these judges make their
selection decisions in accordance with what they take to be public opinion. Indeed, perhaps
judges generally do so. Cf. supra note 156. Or perhaps they respond to the desires of salient
pressure groups. While elected judges, in particular, may feel public pressure to make these
decisions in some "correct" way, see, e.g., Baldwin, 472 U.S. at 396-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459-60 (1985), it is important to emphasize that one cannot
blithely assume that it is "the community's conscience," as opposed to the views of a politically
powerful single-issue voting bloc, that they are being urged to heed. See supra note 199.
203. Indeed, this disparity may well be one of the reasons why jury sentencing, which is
only rarely used in this country when capital punishment is not involved, see Spaziano, 468
U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jury Sentencing: A Last
Stand in Six States, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1 col. 1, is so commonly used in capital
cases, see supra note 134. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 476-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); STANDADS FOR CRMNAL JusTcE 18-1.1 commentary, 18-21 (1980).
(With respect to the many constitutional rules the Court has recognized on account of this
"difference," see supra note 46.)
204. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699 & n.44 (1988) (plurality
opinion); Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2727 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (Powell, 3., concurring in judgment); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468-69, 480-81,
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would seem that judges should be directed to make selection decisions in
capital cases in the same way that they are told to make them in obscenity
cases-as delegates. 205
While the Court has never discussed this argument, it has twice made
statements that may be read as implicitly rejecting delegate voting by capital
sentencing judges. The first of these passages, Justice Rehnquist's dictum
in Barclay v. Florida,206 has already been discussed.2w The second such
intimation is found in Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Spaziano
v. Florida,208 which held that the Constitution does not create a right to
jury sentencing in capital cases.
Spaziano maintained that such a right should be recognized since "the
decision whether to impose death in a particular case is essentially a
retributive judgment,''2 and a jury is the best index of the community's
sense of outrage. 210 Granting, for the sake of argument, that "the retributive
purpose behind the death penalty is the element that sets the penalty apart 21 1
from lesser penalties, which Spaziano allowed that judges may impose,
Justice Blackmun asserted that "the purpose of the death penalty is not
frustrated by, or inconsistent with, ' 21 2 judge sentencing. He noted that the
community has input into the sentencing process in the legislature and that
capital sentencing discretion must, to some extent, be restricted by statute. 21 3
As a result, he implied, the marginal benefits of community participation
in determining the just deserts of individual defendants are not great enough
483, 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 183-84 (1976) (plurality opinion); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15
(1968); Gillers, supra note 54, at 1089.
The truth of this proposition is reflected in the fact that the eighth amendment allows the
imposition of the death penalty only to the extent that it is consistent with our current moral
standards. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 299-300 (1987); Spaziano, 468 U.S.
at 483, 489 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Beyond this, it explains
the Court's particular concern about the representativeness of capital sentencing juries. See
Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182-84 (1986);
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510. See also supra note 203.
Spaziano's refusal to recognize a right to jury sentencing in capital cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 208-20, is not incompatible with this position. Spaziano held simply that
the jury, the community's most authentic spokesman, see 468 U.S. at 461-63, need not
participate in the determination of individual sentences.
205. This reasoning would also militate in favor of jury sentencing in this context. See
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 485-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gillers
supra note 1, at 60-74; Gillers, supra note 54, at 1084-95.
206. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
207. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
208. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
209. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (No. 83-5596)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
210. 468 U.S. at 461.
211. Id. at 462.
212. Id. at 462-63 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 462.
[Vol. 64:617
JURY SELECTION
to justify depriving the State of the freedom to decide whether it should
use judges or juries as capital sentencers. 214
Justice Blackmun made no effort to explain why the special need for
reliability in capital sentencing does not mandate jury sentencing. By dis-
ingenuously denying that Spaziano had made an argument of this nature215
and studiously ignoring the arguments and evidence set forth in Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion, 2 6 he was able to treat the reliability of judicial
sentencing as a non-issue, and summarily to deny its inadequacy. 217 Hence,
his opinion is not persuasive with respect to the question that it purported
to settle. 2 1
Even if this were not so, however, it would be wrong to read Spaziano
as dispositive of the legitimacy of free agency voting by capital sentencing
judges. No one suggested in that case that judges are required to make
selection decisions as delegates, and it is unlikely that Justice Blackmun had
this issue in mind when he said that the community's views need not be
brought to bear on the question of whether any particular defendant deserves
to die. Moreover, the fact that the State's interest in being allowed to
structure its own criminal justice system enables it to delegate capital
sentencing authority to judges instead of juries does not mean that the State
has untrammeled discretion as to the standard to be applied in making
these sentencing decisions. It may not, for example, forbid capital sentencers
to hear and give whatever they deem appropriate mitigating weight to proof
of "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.''219 Finally, a rule requiring capital sentencing
judges to make selection decisions with reference to the community's moral
values would not frustrate the purposes of judicial sentencing, as those
purposes surely do not include a desire to exclude those values from the
sentencing process 20
214. Id. at 462-63.
215. Id. at 459; but see id. at 461; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 209, at 6, 27-37, 41-42.
216. 468 U.S. at 468-70, 481-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. Id. at 459-60, 464.
218. The Court's analysis of Spaziano's constitutional claim is flawed in another respect.
In an effort to downplay the need for jury sentencing in capital cases, Justice Blackmun
described the selection process in a way that unduly minimized the amount of discretion
possessed by capital sentencers, and thus minimized the reliability issues surrounding judicial
sentencing. Compare id. at 462 with McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n.37 (1987). For an excellent
critique of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see Gillers, supra note 54, at 1088-91.
219. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). This principle is fully
applicable when judges are given the responsibility of making capital sentencing decisions. See
-itchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
220. Spaziano did not identify the virtues of making judges capital sentencers. Several factors
are commonly said to justify judge sentencing, see STANDARDS FOR CREN AL JUSTICE, supra
note 203, § 18-1.1 commentary at 18-15 through 18-18, but most of them are plainly inapplicable
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In any event, if reliability does not justify requiring judges to serve as
their communities' delegates in death cases, why should judges be forbidden
to act as free agents in obscenity cases? Is the use of one of these
representational models more suitable to one context than the other? Is one
model generally preferable to the other?
To a certain extent, these questions raise issues that are identical to those
raised by the use of different voting rules when these selection decisions are
delegated to juries. However, the differences between these two comparisons
are worth noting.
In some respects, delegate voting would seem a stronger option when
judges are the triers than when juries are. To begin with, judges may be
more open than jurors to recognizing distinctions between their views and
those of the communities in which they sit. Intuitively, it seems reasonable
to suppose that judges, who tend to be unusually well off, well educated
white males who may not even live in the relevant "community," may be
more receptive than jurors to evidence that the community feels differently
about erotica or the death penalty than they do. If they have presided over
enough jury trials of selection issues in either context, 221 judges may also
be more capable of gauging how the community would resolve those issues
in any given case.222 In addition, their professional training and experience
may make it more realistic to expect judges to subordinate their own views
in the event that they conflict with the community's.m Finally, when judges
to capital sentencing. (For example, the use of bifurcated trials in capital cases eliminates the
problem of getting information relating to sentencing to the jury without prejudicing the
defendant on the issue of guilt. Concerns about juries' failure to make use of probation are
similarly inapposite in this context.) However, two of the major justifications for judge
sentencing in non-capital cases may apply to capital cases: Judges are said to have superior
knowledge about things like the likelihood of a defendant's future dangerousness, see STAr-
DARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 1.1 commentary at 46-47(1968), and to be able to promote consistency in sentencing, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 252 (1975) (plurality opinion). But see Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 476 n.17, 477-90 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, these considerations simply do not
require that judges make the moral component of capital sentencing decisions with reference
to their personal moral codes.
221. A capital sentencing judge could get this experience only if juries in his jurisdiction
return advisory verdicts, see supra note 196, or if he were called upon only to make capital
sentencing decisions when a right to jury sentencing has been waived. (Waiver is commonly
permitted, although defendants may be unable to waive jury sentencing without the consent
of the prosecutor or the court. See Gillers, supra note 1, at 102-19.) The situation with respect
to obscenity cases is quite different. See supra note 195.
222. Obscenity defendants are said to prefer to place their fate in the hands of judges thanjuries. See Comment, Community Standards in Obscenity Adjudication, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1277, 1287 n.64 (1978). If this is true, one can only wonder whether it is because defendants
feel that judges are more likely than juries to implement the community's standards, less
likely, or neither. (Perhaps judges are thought better triers of "redeeming value.")
223. Cf. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 66, at 469 ("one underlying assumption of
the book has been that the judge is more disciplined than the jury, by virtue of tradition and
his official role"). Of course, where judges are elected, pressure from single-issue voters may
also affect their willingness to do this. Given the current political climate, this pressure would
likely be in the direction of excessive censorship and vengefulness.
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are the decisionmakers, the alternative to delegate voting is idiosyncratic
selection decisions made by people who are unlikely to share the views of
the "average" person in the community. Even assuming that judges are not
the best assessors of how the community would decide any given case, any
increase in the degree to which selection decisions reflect the community's
values may be a fair trade-off for a reduction in the level of arbitrariness
inherent when judges make those decisions as free agents.
Nonetheless, there are two respects in which delegate voting is more
problematic when the job of making selection decisions is assigned to judges.
Judges may not be as likely as jurors to be familiar with the relevant
standards of the "average" person in the "community." For one thing,
judges are not as likely to be "average" members of the legally relevant
communities, or even to know them. For another, they are less likely than
jurors to live in the community or to socialize with its inhabitants. Judges
tend to lack significant exposure to jury decisions on these issues, 224 and to
the extent that sociological evidence cannot bridge this information gap,2
they may have no reliable insight into the relevant community values.2 6 In
jury trials, we rely on the fact that juries are multimember tribunals drawn
from a broad base of the community (and sometimes on the absence of a
requirement of unanimous verdictsz27) to reduce the impact of individual
jurors' misimpressions of community values, but there is no analogous
mechanism for steering judges towards a more accurate appraisal of a
community's views. 22s
224. This cannot be otherwise in a jurisdiction in which juries play no role in the capital
sentencing process. See supra note 196. But even where this is not the case, there are simply
not enough capital cases for judges to get significant exposure to jury verdicts. See Gillers,
supra note 1, at 58-59. Nor does there seem to be a sufficient volume of obscenity litigation
to provide trial judges with this type of education. See Project, supra note 75, at 870-77.
225. See supra note 107; notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
226. More than one judge has admitted to being ignorant of the "community standards"
that are supposed to be applied in an obscenity case. See, e.g., United States v. Various
Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill,
J., concurring in result); United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 570-71 (9th
Cir. 1977); Goldfluss, What is "Community" in Judging Obscenity?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21,
1981, at 2, col. 3; cf. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule
No. 1303, 562 F.2d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1977) (judges, jurors can express only their personal
reactions to material), cert. denied sub nom. Long v. United States, 436 U.S. 931 (1978).
227. See supra note 115.
228. Appellate review cannot serve this function. Given the broad discretion involved in the
selection aspect of a capital sentencing decision, meaningful appellate review of selection
decisions is probably impossible in all but the most extreme cases. See McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 314-19; Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31, 340 n.7 (1985). A trier's application
of "community values" to the facts of an obscenity case may be even less amenable to
appellate review. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301, 305-06 (1977); id. at 315-16
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Various Articles, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d at 156; F. SCHAUER,
supra note 21, at 150-51; Lockhart, supra note 32, at 551-52; Note, Community Standards,
Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HLv. L. REv. 1838, 1844 (1975).
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Thus, many of the conclusions reached in Parts II and III of this article
seem equally applicable to the evaluation of the two competing models of
judicial decisionmaking. For example, there is no clear reason to require
that selection decisions be made in a different manner in capital sentencing
and obscenity cases. And the identification of the more reliable decisional
rule seems to turn on the relative magnitudes of the risks of sampling error
and incorrect estimation of public opinion.
However, there is one significant respect in which those conclusions would
appear inapplicable in this context: Since free agency voting is less likely
than delegate voting to result in judge-made selection decisions reflecting a
community's actual preferences, Miller's requirement of delegate voting in
obscenity cases seems easier to justify when the decisionmakers are judges.
But that, in turn, makes the lack of a similar requirement in death cases
only more striking.
V.
It is a commonplace that, in this country, courts of law dispense justice
on behalf of the People. To this end, judges and juries are supposed to
represent "the community." But what does that mean? And how well does
the theory describe reality?
These questions have a special constitutional significance when the courts
are asked to decide whether a defendant deserves to live or die, or whether
a work deserves to be condemned as obscene or insulated against government
regulation. Yet the law seems never even to have noticed the fact that three
different representational models-delegate voting, the mirror model, and
judicial free agency-are used in these two settings. 9 It seems never to
have asked why this should be so.
Perhaps this is because, as Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois
Supreme Court once noted, "What is familiar tends to become what is
right." 2 °0 Or perhaps, in an age of increasing specialization in the law,
people are unaware of the similarities between these two branches of the
law, and thus have not thought about considering their asymmetries. What-
ever the cause, we need to encourage further discussion of how, in these
and other contexts, judges and juries should speak for the community.
But cf. United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise Seizure No. 170, 750 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1984). Even if this were not the case, double jeopardy principles would immunize many
selection decisions from appellate review in each context. See, e.g., Poland v. Arizona, 476
U.S. 147 (1986); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980).
229. Professor Gillers has adverted to the difference between the way juries are to make
selection decisions in these contexts, see Gillers, supra note 1, at 97-98 n.447; however, the
focus of this work lies elsewhere, and so it does not analyze the significance of this phenomenon.
230. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAgv. L. Rlv. 1, 7 (1956).
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